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Preemption of State Tort Law
by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court
Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone
BY RICHARD C. AUSNESS*
INTRODUCTION
U nder the American constitutional system, the states are treated as
sovereign entities.' Regardless of separate sovereignty, the federal
government can prevent the states from regulating in an area of law if
federal legislation has occupied that area of the law. The principle by
which federal laws trump state laws is known as preemption.3
One of the most controversial issues in preemption law is whether
federal safety statutes should preempt state tort law doctrines, particularly
* Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968,
University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University. I would like to thank my
friend and colleague, Mary Davis, for giving me the benefit of her knowledge and
wisdom. I would also like to thank the University of Kentucky College of Law for
its generous financial support.
'See Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (describing the federal system
as "a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign..."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,435 (1793) (Iredell, J.,
dissenting) ("The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government
actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers
reserved.").
2 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (holding that
the Natural Gas Act preempts state statute purporting to regulate the issuance of
securities by natural gas pipelines); Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric.
Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,478 (1984) (concluding that the Agricul-
tural Fair Practices Act preempts Michigan's agricultural marketing statute).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197(7th ed. 1999) ("The principle (derived from
the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsis-
tent state law or regulation.").
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
where defective products are involved.' Legal commentators have
suggested a number of reasons why federal preemption of state tort law is
often undesirable. For example, when the federal government preempts
state tort law doctrines, it ousts states from an area where they have
historically exercised their police powers. Furthermore, if federal safety
laws are inadequate, preemption of state tort law leaves the public exposed
to the risk of injury from dangerous products and activities.6 Finally,
preemption of start tort law denies injured parties the right to compensa-
tion.7
The preemption controversy originated in the 1980s, when enterprises
subject to federal regulatory standards first began raising federal preemp-
tion as a defense in tort cases. This produced a large body of inconsistent
and confusing case law. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' holding that the 1969 Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempted common-law failure-to-
warn claims.'" Unfortunately, the Cipollone decision did not succeed in
clarifying the law of federal preemption." Although the Supreme Court has
' See generally DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 28 (3d ed. 2000); Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State
Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REV. 187, 200-31 (1993); Mary J. Davis,
Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967,
997-1028 (2002); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); M. Stuart
Madden, Federal Preemption ofInconsistent State Safety Obligations, 21 PACE L.
REV. 103, 111-58 (2000); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products
Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411 (2004).
Ausness, supra note 4, at 247-48.
6 Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 904 (1996)
(quoting Judge Jack Weinstein in Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128,
1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
7 Grey, supra note 4, at 562. The author notes that "[c]urrent federal legislation
concerning product safety . . . typically does not provide a damages remedy,
requiring instead only that manufacturers engage in certain affirmative conduct,
such as ... warnings.., or meeting certain safety standards." Id.
8See Ausness, supra note 4, at 201-34 (discussing lower federal and state court
preemption cases decided during the 1980s and early 1990s).
' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
'0 1d. at 524.
" Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal
Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691,
696 (1997).
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decided several preemption cases since Cipollone, and will likely decide
even more in the near future, 2 confusion in this area has not abated. 3
This article shall attempt to trace the twists and turns of Supreme Court
preemption jurisprudence. 4 Part I provides a brief overview of federal
12 Davis, supra note 4, at 969.
13 Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-
emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1380 (1998)
[hereinafter Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption] ("Since Cipollone,
however, the Supreme Court has not only backpeddled but also issued confusing
and inconsistent opinions that further blur the law of pre-emption."); John A.
Chatowski, Note, Cipollone and the Clear Statement Rule: Doctrinal Anomaly or
New Development in Federal Preemption?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 769, 770 (1993)
("Most legal commentators agree that the Supreme Court has failed to develop a
uniform approach to preemption; their decisions 'take on an ad hoc, unprincipled
quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis.' ") (quoting William W.
Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975)); Trent Kirk, Comment,
Fraud-on-the-FDA & Buckman-The Evolving Law of Federal Preemption in
Products Liability Litigation, 53 S.C. L. REV. 673, 699 (2002) ("The Supreme
Court has provided some insight and much confusion for analyzing preemption
within the products liability context, beginning with Cipollone and continuing with
its recent decision in Buckman.").
" This examination will be limited to cases involving federal preemption of
state tort law. Since Cipollone, the Supreme Court has considered several
preemption cases involving state statutes and administrative regulations that are
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 550 (2001) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising
Act preempts state regulation of cigarette advertising); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (concluding that federal law preempts
state statute barring state entities from doing business with companies trading with
Burma); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 116 (2000) (ruling that federal law
preempts state oil tanker regulations); AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524
U.S. 214, 228 (1998) (finding that the Federal Communications Act of 1934
preempts telephone company's state law breach of contract claim); Barnett Bank
v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37 (1996) (determining that federal banking statute
preempts state law which prohibits banks from selling insurance in small towns);
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232-34 (1995) (deciding that the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1970, while preempting state regulation of air carriers,
does not preempt state court enforcement of air carrier contracts); U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499-508 (1993) (stating that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act does not preempt state statute regulating insurance to the extent that
it protects policy holders).
Over the years, ERISA has been a particularly fertile source of preemption
litigation. See, e.g., Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2001) (concluding
2003-2004]
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preemption law, considering the constitutional sources of preemption and
the traditional preemption categories. " Part II analyzes Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,' 6 the source of modem Supreme Court doctrine regarding
preemption of state tort law by federal safety legislation. 7 Part III reviews
seven post-Cipollone Supreme Court preemption cases: CSX Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Easterwood,18 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,'9 Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr,2 ° Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin,2' Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co.,22 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee,23 and
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine.24 An examination of these cases reveals how
the Court's preemption jurisprudence appears to be bereft of any coherent
theory or methodology.
25
Part IV explores Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence and offers
some suggestions for improving the quality of federal preemption law.26
that ERISA preempts state statute which revoked a spouse's beneficial interest in
ERISA employee benefit plans upon divorce); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833,
841-55 (1997) (finding that ERISA preempts state law allowing nonparticipant
spouse to devise interest in undistributed pension plan benefits); UNUM Life Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 378 (1999) (declaring that ERISA preempts
state rule characterizing certain employee health plan administrators as insurer's
agents), overruled in part by 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (holding that
ERISA does not preempt California law mandating payment of prevailing wages);
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 668 (1995) (deciding that ERISA does not preempt state statute requiring
hospitals to collect surcharges from commercial insurers and HMOs); Dist. of
Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 132-33 (1992) (ruling that
ERISA preempts state law requiring employers to provide health insurance for
injured employees who qualify for workers' compensation benefits).
'5 See infra notes 27-90 and accompanying text.
6 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
'7 See infra notes 91-241 and accompanying text.
'8CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), superseded by statute
as stated in 87 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 1996).
"9 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), appealed sub non.
Lindsey v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 150 F.3d 1307 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
20 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
21 Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanldin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
22 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
23 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
24 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
25 See infra notes 242-536 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 537-99 and accompanying text.
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First, I recommend that the Court limit itself to an express preemption
analysis when the statute in question contains preemptive language.
Second, the presumption against preemption should be conceptualized in
an explicit "clear statement" rule which would require the Court to uphold
state tort law when Congress has not clearly expressed its intent to preempt
state law. Third, saving clauses should be read in pari materia with express
preemption provisions. Finally, the Court should allow administrative
agencies to preempt common-law claims by regulation only if they formally
and expressly exercise their preemptive authority.
I. A DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION LAW
Preemption doctrine concerns the power of Congress to prohibit the
states from regulating in certain areas and, where the states are allowed to
regulate, to assert primacy in a conflict between state and federal regulatory
schemes. 27 The power to preempt ensures that federal law prevails over
conflicting state statutes, 2 local ordinances 29 and even state common-law
doctrines.3" Although no one questions the existence of federal preemptive
27 Professor Gardbaum argues that preemption applies to situations where
Congress deprives states of their power to regulate in a given area, regardless of
whether state law conflicts with federal law. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771 (1994).
28 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98-99
(1992) (declaring that OSHA preempts state occupational and safety standards
unless the state receives federal approval); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485
U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (ruling that the federal Natural Gas Act preempts state statute
purporting to regulate issuance of long-term securities by natural gas pipeline
companies); Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding state agricultural marketing statute preempted
by federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act).
29 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973)
(holding municipal airport curfew preempted by FAA regulations).
30 See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,500 (1987) (holding that
the Clean Water Act bars private nuisance actions against out-of-state polluters);
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (holding Natural Gas Act
preempts calculation of damages under state contract doctrines); Chicago & N.W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 331 (1981) (ruling Interstate
Commerce Act preempts state tort claim based on abandonment of service); Old
Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272-73 (1974) (noting
National Labor Relations Act preempts certain state-law libel claims); Sperry v.
Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963) (ruling that state may not enforce
licensing requirements giving state board power to review federal determinations);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,245-46 (1959) (ruling
2003-20041
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power, legal scholars disagree about its exact constitutional source. Many
legal scholars3 and the Supreme Court itself,32 have concluded that the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution " provides the basis
for Congress's power to preempt state law. The Supremacy Clause declares
that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land.34
Some scholars, however, question whether it actually gives Congress the
power to preempt state law.35 They suggest that the Supremacy Clause
National Labor Relations Act preempts state tort-law action against labor union for
engaging in unfair labor practices).
3" Valerie Watnick, Federal Preemption of Tort Claims Under FIFRA: The
Erosion of a Defense, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 427 (2003) (contending that
"[t]he doctrine of federal preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution"); Mary Ann K. Bosack, Note, Cigarette Act Preemp-
tion-Refining the Analysis, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 756, 761 (1991) ("The roots of the
preemption doctrine lie in the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion."); Sarah Butcher, Note, Fraud-on-the-FDA and GeneticallyModifiedFoods:
Will the Action Stand?, 22 REV. LITIG. 669,671 (2003) ("The source of preemption
is the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution."); Stephen D. Otero,
Note, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling Cipollone's Preemption
Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions of Federalism, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 788 (1995) ("The preemption doctrine derives from the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution"); Kara M. Turner, Recent Development,
The Great Train Robbery That Wasn 't: Practical Implications of CSX v.
Easterwood, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1449, 1457 (1994) ("The doctrine of preemption
derives its authority from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.").
32 See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (stating that the
Supremacy Clause "is basic to this constitutional command that all conflicting state
provisions be without effect"); Chicago & NW. Transp. Co., 450 U.S. at 317
(concluding that "[t]he underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine.., is that
the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that 'interfere with or are contrary to,
the laws of congress' "); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("No state
can add to or take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute, for Article VI
of the Constitution provides that 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.' ").
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
31 See id. The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
31 See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J.
2085, 2088 (2000) (declaring that "it is critically important to note [that] the
Supremacy Clause itself does not authorize Congress to preempt state laws");
Gardbaum, supra note 27, at 768 ("In the American context, the most common and
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operates like a "choice of law" provision, ensuring that federal law will
prevail over state law in a conflict.36 If this is the case, the power to exclude
state regulation in an area must arise from another constitutional source.
One possibility is that the power may arise from Congress's enumerated
powers, such as the Commerce Clause.37 It has also been suggested that the
Necessary and Proper Clause3" might authorize federal preemption of state
law in some cases.39
Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Savage v. Jones,4° courts and
commentators have divided preemption into two categories, express and
implied, and further subdivided the latter into field preemption and conflict
preemption.4 Express preemption occurs when Congress uses express
language declaring its intention to preempt state law.42 Congress may also
impliedly preempt state law when a federal regulatory scheme effectively
occupies a field, leaving no room for state regulation. Implied preemption
may also occur when state law conflicts in some way with federal law.43
Although some commentators question whether preemption can be
compartmentalized into seemingly airtight categories,4 this construct is still
useful for analyzing preemption issues.
consequential error is the belief that Congress's power of preemption is closely and
essentially connected to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.").
36 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 303 (2000) ("The
Supremacy Clause requires preemption only when the rules provided by state and
federal law contradict each other, so that a court cannot simultaneously follow
both.").
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Grey, supra note 4, at 607 ("There is no
question that the federal government has the power under the Commerce Clause to
preempt state tort claims."); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm:
Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (1998)
("Congress' capacity to preempt state laws flows from both the powers delegated
to Congress through the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause.").
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
" See Gardbaum, supra note 27, at 782.
40 Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533-40 (1912).
4' Madden, supra note 4, at 105-10.
42 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983), overruled in part by Scheiding v. GMC, 993
P.2d 996 (2000); Madden, supra note 4, at 105-07.
43 Jordan, supra note 37, at 1150-51.
44 See Nelson, supra note 36, at 262 ("Once we recognize that all preemption
cases are about contradiction between state and federal law, we should begin to
question the usefulness of dividing them into the separate analytical categories
of 'express' preemption, 'field' preemption, and 'conflict' preemption."); Raeker-
Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at 1397 (arguing that




Express preemption occurs when a federal statute specifically excludes
state regulation in a particular area.45 For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.,46 the Court concluded that the Federal Warehouse Act's"7
preemptive language manifested an intent to displace state jurisdiction over
federally licensed warehouse operators. 8 This prompted the Court to enjoin
state proceedings against a federal licensee for violating state rate
discrimination laws, thus avoiding the problem of dual regulation.4 9
Federal agencies acting within the scope of their delegated authority
may also expressly preempt state law.50 Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Ass 'n v. de la Cuesta5" provides a good illustration of this principle. This
case involved a conflict between a Federal Home Loan Bank Board
regulation concerning due-on-sale clauses in home mortgage contracts52 and
a state common-law doctrine that limited the use of due-on-sale
doing in pre-emption cases"); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The
Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69,70-71 (1988) ("Although the Supreme
Court has referred to four categories of preemption in almost every one of its recent
preemption cases, the categories are useless in difficult cases."); Ellen L. Theroff,
Note, Preemption ofAirbag Litigation: Just a Lot of Hot Air?, 76 VA. L. REV. 577,
581-82 (1990) ("These three categories of preemption are certainly not analytically
airtight ... ").
" See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)
(National Association of Attorneys General airline fare advertising guidelines);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983) (employee benefit
plans); Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (union shop
agreements).
46 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
" United States Warehouse Act, ch. 313, 39 Stat. 486 (1916) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-256 (2000)).
48 Rice, 331 U.S. at 233-34.
491 Id. at 236-37.
50 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (FCC cable
television regulations); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1962) (treasury
regulations); Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1958)
(government procurement regulations); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S.
187, 189-90 (1956) (government procurement regulations).
"' Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
52 Id. at 146 (citing the regulation governing due-on-sale clauses at 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8-3(f) (1982)).
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provisions. 3 The Court observed that the Home Owners' Loan Act of
193 354 gave the Board broad authority over federal savings and loan
associations.55 Because the Board clearly indicated its intent to displace
state law concerning due-on-sale clauses, an action within its delegated
authority, the Court ruled that the Board's regulation expressly preempted
state law.56
B. Field Preemption
Field preemption occurs when federal regulation in a particular area is
so pervasive that the courts must assume that Congress intended to occupy
the field entirely and exclude all state regulation. 7 Schneidewind v. ANR
Pipeline Co.5 8 provides an interesting example of this type of preemption.
In Schneidewind, a public utility company challenged the validity of a
Michigan statute requiring companies to obtain approval from the state
public service commission before issuing long-term securities. 9 The utility
company claimed that the federal Natural Gas Act60 preempted the
Michigan statute.61 The Court observed that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") exercised substantial authority over the financing
activities of natural gas companies to ensure that pipelines and other
facilities were "financed in accordance with the public interest."62
Accordingly, the Court found that the Michigan statute constituted an
attempt to regulate natural gas company rates and facilities, thus encroach-
" The California Supreme Court recognized this common-law doctrine in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978) (en banc). The
Wellenkamp court held that due-on-sale clauses constituted an unreasonable
restraint on alienation unless the lender could "demonstrate that enforcement [was]
reasonably necessary to protect against impairment of its security or the risk of
default." Id. at 976-77.
54 Home Owners' Act of 1933, Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (2000)).
11 Fid. Fed., 458 U.S. at 160-62.
561d. at 170.
" See, e.g., Susan D. Hall, Note, Preemption Analysis After Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 90 KY. L.J. 251, 254 (2001).
" Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
59 Id. at 296 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.301-.303 (West 1967 &
Supp. 1987) (repealed 1995)).
60 Natural Gas Act, Ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (2000)).




ing upon a regulatory area already occupied by the FERC.63 Field preemp-
tion principles thus led the Court to hold that the Michigan statute was
preempted.
C. Conflict Preemption
When federal statutes or regulations and state law actually conflict, the
state law is overridden.' Actual conflict may occur in several scenarios.
First, a conflict may exist because of impossibility when state law requires
action that federal law forbids, or vice versa.6" Second, a conflict may arise
when state law frustrates federal regulatory goals by hindering conduct that
federal law intends to encourage,66 or by promoting conduct that federal
law seeks to discourage.67
1. Impossibility
McDermott v. Wisconsin68 exemplifies a situation in which compliance
with both state and federal law is impossible. In McDermott, the Court
ruled that the labeling provisions of the Federal Food and Drugs Act
69
preempted a Wisconsin labeling statute.70 The defendant, who sold syrup
imported from another state, showed that syrup which met the federal
labeling standards would be considered mislabeled under the Wisconsin
statute.7 The defendant further asserted that compliance with the state
631Id. at 310.
64 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 57, at 255.
65 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITr. L.
REV. 607, 630 (1985) ("A conflict sufficient to invalidate a state regulatory
requirement can exist ... when it is impossible to comply with both federal and
state law. . . ."); Bratton, supra note 13, at 626.66 See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145, 150-54 (1982) (holding
invalid a state tax on goods Congress exempted from customs duties to encourage
use of American ports); Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967)
(holding invalid a state regulation that frustrated Congress's intent to allow people
to take unfair labor charges to the NLRB).
6 7 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639
(1973) (refusing to uphold a local ordinance regulating jet aircraft, in part because
of fears about safety and regulatory issues if other municipalities followed suit).
68 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
69 Id. at 127 (citing the Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1914)
(repealed 1938)).7 Id. at 137.
7'Id. at 126-27.
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statute would result in liability under the federal act.72 The Court found that
the defendant could not satisfy the requirements of both the state and
federal statutes and, based on the conflict preemption doctrine of impossi-
bility, invalidated the state statute."
2. Obstacle Preemption
Even when federal and state law provisions do not openly conflict, state
law may nevertheless be preempted because it interferes with federal
regulatory objectives.74 This is known as "obstacle preemption."75 For
example, in Michigan Canners &FreezersAss 'n v. Agricultural Marketing
& Bargaining Board,76 Michigan enacted a statute establishing a
state-administered system under which growers' associations were
organized and certified as exclusive bargaining agents for all producers of
a particular agricultural commodity.7 7 "The Michigan Agricultural
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (MACMA)" was "the sole sales
and bargaining agent for asparagus producers in the state. 78 A group of
asparagus farmers and processors challenged the Michigan statute because
it required nonmember growers to pay service fees and adhere to contracts
negotiated by MACMA. 79 The plaintiffs argued that these provisions
conflicted with the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967
("FAFPA") 0 and thus should be preempted.81
The Court noted that both the AFPA and the Michigan statute were
intended to facilitate collective action among producers and to protect
producers from coercive action by processors.8 2 Unlike the state statute,
however, the federal act also protected individual producers against
72 See id. at 132-33.
" See id. at 137.
71 See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1997) (holding that state
community property law interfered with provisions and objectives ofERISA); Int'l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (concluding private nuisance
actions against out-of-state polluters were not compatible with the regulatory
objectives of the Clean Water Act).
75 Davis, supra note 4, at 970.
76Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461 (1984).
7 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 290.701-290.726 (West 1984).
78 Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass 'n, 467 U.S. at 468.
79 Id. at 467-68.
80 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2306 (2000).
8' Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass 'n, 467 U.S. at 468.
02 Id. at 464-66.
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coercive action by producers' associations.83 According to the Court,
Congress enacted the AFPA with the intent to safeguard the right of
producers to choose the method of marketing their products.84 On the other
hand, "[t]he Michigan Act... empower[ed] producers' associations to do
precisely what the federal Act forb[ade] them to do."85 Consequently, the
Court concluded that the Michigan statute stood "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress," and must give way under the doctrine of obstacle preemption.86
These basic preemption categories serve as an important foundation for
analyzing the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence. One or more of
the categories is present in each of the cases discussed in this Article. For
example, the Court relied on an express preemption analysis in Cipollone,
Easterwood, Myrick, Medtronic, Shanklin, Geier, and Sprietsma. 7 A brief
field preemption analysis is evident in Sprietsma.8 8 Obstacle preemption
played a significant role in Myrick, Geier, Buckman, and Sprietsma.89
However, none of the cases discussed in this Article involve impossibility
because that form of preemption is not applicable to tort law.90
II. CIPOLLONE REVISITED
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.9" was the first in a long series of cases
in which the United States Supreme Court determined whether federal
product safety laws preempted common-law tort claims for injuries from
See id. at 464--68.
84 See id. at 470-74.
8 Id. at 477-78.
16 Id. at 478.
" See infra notes 91-449, 475-517 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 508-13 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 277-304, 396-517 and accompanying text.
90 Those who are subject to criminal statutes or administrative regulations face
a variety of coercive sanctions for violations, such as fines, imprisonment, or
prohibitory injunctions. Individuals in this position thus have little choice but to
comply. However, when they are subject to conflicting state and federal criminal
statutes or regulations, compliance is truly impossible. Tort law is more flexible.
Tortfeasors, at least in theory, are only subject to damage claims and, therefore, do
not have to alter their behavior if they are willing to compensate their victims.
Thus, it is "possible" to comply with conflicting state and federal requirements as
long as at least one is enforced by only civil damage awards. Raeker-Jordan, The
Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at 1444.
9' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
[VOL. 92
PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW
defective products.9 2 It represents a well-intentioned, but unsuccessful,
attempt by the Court to rationalize its preemption doctrine.93
A. Precursors to Cipollone
The first modem case to consider the effect of federal law on state tort
claims was San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,94 decided in
1959. Garmon involved a labor dispute between a lumber supply company
and a number of labor unions. A state court awarded damages against the
unions for engaging in unfair labor practices.95 On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had vested the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") with the power to determine which union activities were
protected and which activities constituted unfair labor practices. 96 The
Court held that if the NLRB determined that a particular activity was either
protected or prohibited, the states were ousted from any jurisdiction over
that activity.97 Moreover, state jurisdiction could be displaced even when
the NLRB failed to make any determination concerning the legality of
union activities.98 Accordingly, the Court held that the state court was
without authority to award damages to the company for injuries caused by
the unions' activities.99
Twenty-five years after the Garmon decision, the Court decided in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.'00 that state law punitive damages claims
were not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA").10 The estate of
Karen Silkwood brought suit against the manufacturer of plutonium fuel
rods, alleging that the defendant's failure to comply with federal safety
92 For a discussion of the Cipollone decision, see 2 OWEN ET AL., supra note 4,
§ 28.3; Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of the Cipollone Case on Federal
Preemption Law, 15 J. PRODS. & Toxics LIAB. 1 (1993); Mary J. Davis, The
Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1075, 1116-34 (1996); Jeffrey R. Stem, Note, Preemption Doctrine and the
Failure of Textualism in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 80 VA. L. REV. 979 (1994).
93 See Leflar & Adler, supra note 11, at 696.
94 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
95 Id. at 237-38.
96 Id. at 244-45.
97 Id. at 245.
9' Id. at 245-46.
99 Id. at 246-48.
o Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
'0' Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (2000).
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standards resulted in decedent's exposure to highly toxic plutonium.' 02 The
estate based its claims on state common-law negligence and strict liability
theories. 03 A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded punitive and
compensatory damages. 0 4 However, the punitive award was reversed by a
federal appeals court.'0 5 Although it had recently declared that the Atomic
Energy Act "occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the
limited powers expressly ceded to the states,"'0 6 the Court reversed the
appeals court and reinstated the trial court's punitive damages award.'07
After reviewing the history of the Atomic Energy Act, the Court
determined that Congress had intended for the operators of nuclear power
plants and other facilities to remain subject to liability under state tort law
even though the Act vested exclusive regulatory authority over nuclear
power safety in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.0 8 The Court stated
that "Congress assumed that traditional principles of state tort law would
apply with full force unless they were expressly supplanted."' 9 The Court
based this conclusion on the fact that Congress did not mention state tort
claims when it could have expressly preempted them."0 The Court also
found it "difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment,
remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct."' " Furthermore, the Court reasoned, Congress must have believed
that nuclear power licensees would normally be subject to tort liability
because it enacted the Price Anderson Act in 1957 to limit their liability
when large-scale nuclear accidents occurred." 2
Shortly after Silkwood, however, the Court preempted a state law tort
claim in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette."3 In Ouellette, property
owners on the Vermont shore of Lake Champlain brought suit against a
paper mill located on the New York side of the lake." 4 The plaintiffs
sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant's
102 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 243.
103 Id. at 243-44.
4Id. at 245.
05 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 922-23 (10th Cir. 1981).
106 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
212(1983).
107 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 258.
'8 Id. at 250-56.
09 Id. at 255.
"0 Id. at 251.
"I Id.
112 Id. at 251-52.
"13 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
114 Id. at 483-84.
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discharge of pollutants into Lake Champlain constituted a nuisance under
Vermont common law."5 The paper mill claimed that the plaintiffs'
state-law nuisance action was preempted because the mill held a federally
authorized permit that allowed it to discharge effluent into the lake." 6
The Court declared that state law might be preempted, even if federal
and state regulatory objectives were the same, "if it [interfered] with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal.""'7
According to the Court, if a New York permit holder were subject to
damages under Vermont nuisance law, the law of Vermont would
"effectively override both the permit requirements and the policy choices
made by [New York]" with respect to economic and environmental
issues." '8 Consequently, the Court concluded that the Clean Water Act
preempted the plaintiffs' nuisance action.'' 9
The last case involving federal preemption of state tort claims decided
prior to Cipollone was English v. General Electric Co.120 In English, the
Court held that the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 did not preempt a
state tort law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 2' The
plaintiff in English was a laboratory technician at a nuclear fuel production
plant who informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about various
safety violations at the plant. 122 The plaintiff claimed that her employer,
General Electric, retaliated against her for reporting these safety violations
and eventually fired her. 123 General Electric responded that a provision in
the Energy Reorganization Act providing an administrative remedy to
protect whistle-blowers in nuclear facilities from retaliation by their
employers preempted state law remedies.
124
With no express preemption provision, the Court was forced to employ
field and conflict preemption analysis. 25 The Court first considered field
preemption and concluded that Congress meant to preempt the field of
nuclear safety, but that it did not "clearly and manifestly" intend "to
preempt all state tort laws that had traditionally been available to"
15 Id. at 484.
116 Id.
"
7 Id. at 494.
"
8 Id. at 495.
"
9 Id. at 500.
120 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
121 Id. at 83, 86.
"'22 Id. at 74-75.
123 Id. at 75-76.
124 Id. at 82.
25 Id. at 78, 80.
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wrongfully discharged employees. 126 Likewise, the Court concluded that
state tort law would not obstruct or frustrate the regulatory purposes of the
Atomic Energy Act or the whistle-blower provisions of the Energy
Reorganization Act. 1
27
With the exception of Garmon,128 in the years prior to Cipollone the
Court generally refused to preempt state tort claims, even where there was
an important federal regulatory interest at stake. 29 During this period, the
Court expressed a belief that Congress was willing to tolerate a certain
amount of tension between federal regulatory objectives and state tort
law. '3 Furthermore, the Court assumed that Congress would not want to
deny compensation to accident victims who were injured by the wrongdo-
ing of corporate employees, and that if Congress did wish to leave accident
victims without a remedy in such cases, it would say so expressly.'
However, this tolerance toward state tort law would change significantly
in 1992 with the Cipollone decision.
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 132 involved the preemptive effect of
federal warning requirements on state tort claims against cigarette
manufacturers. 33 The 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
required all cigarette packages to contain the following language: "Caution:
Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."' 34 This language
was strengthened in 1969.D5 In Cipollone, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended
1
26 Id. at 83.
127 Id. at 84-90.
128 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Garmon
is arguably distinguishable from Cipollone because it was concerned with labor
relations, an area traditionally subject to pervasive federal regulation. Moreover,
Garmon's tort claims involved economic losses, not physical injuries. Id.
129 See Davis, supra note 4, at 1001.
130 English, 496 U.S. at 85-86; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984).
'3' Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
132 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
'33 Id. at 508.
114 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1341 (2000)).
13' Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84
Stat. 87 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334).
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in 1969, expressly preempted tort claims against cigarette manufacturers for
inadequate health warnings in the advertising or promotion of their
products.'36 However, the Court also concluded that the 1969 Act did not
preempt claims against cigarette manufacturers for breach of express
warranty, misrepresentation, or conspiracy.' 37
The decedent, Rose Cipollone, a lifetime smoker, died of lung cancer
in 1984.138 The executor of her estate brought suit against the defendant
tobacco companies, alleging that they failed to provide adequate warnings
about the health risks of smoking, expressly warranted that their products
were not dangerous to the health of consumers, attempted to neutralize the
effects of statutory warnings, ignored medical evidence about the dangers
of smoking, and conspired to prevent such medical evidence from reaching
the general public.'39 The trial jury denied recovery to Ms. Cipollone under
New Jersey's comparative fault statute, but awarded $400,000 to her
husband. 4 ° The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs state law tort
claims were preempted by the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.'
4 1
When Cipollone came before the United States Supreme Court, the
Justices divided into three groups. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor, wrote the plurality opinion. 
4
The plurality decided that the 1965 Act did not preempt any of the
plaintiff s tort claims. 4 3 However, these Justices did conclude that the 1969
Act expressly preempted state tort claims against cigarette manufacturers
"insofar as [those] claims... require[d] a showing that respondents' post-
1969 advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more
clearly stated, warnings."' 144 On the other hand, they determined that the
1969 Act did not preempt claims against cigarette manufacturers based on
breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, or conspiracy. 45 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, contended that neither
the 1965 Act nor the 1969 Act preempted any of the plaintiffs state tort
claims.'46 Finally, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that
136 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
'37 Id. at 525-30.
Id. at 508.
'
3 9 Id. at 508-09.
140 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 1990).
141 Id. at 582.
142 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 507.
1
43 Id. at 519-20.
'44Id. at 524.




plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were preempted by the 1965 Act and that
the 1969 Act expressly preempted all of the plaintiffs state tort claims.
47
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, purported to employ two
rules of statutory construction in Cipollone. First, he declared that the Court
should not have relied on implied preemption theories when the statute in
question contained an express preemption provision. 48 According to
Justice Stevens, when Congress defined a specific area as preempted, it
impliedly intended to exclude all other areas from the preemptive reach of
the statute. 149 In this case, since cigarette labeling statutes contained express
preemption provisions, and no other preemptive language, Justice Stevens
only used an express preemption analysis. Second, Justice Stevens
contended that express preemption provisions should be interpreted
narrowly. 50 He based this narrow construction, or "clear meaning"
approach, on the Court's longstanding presumption against the preemption
of state regulations enacted to protect the health, safety, or welfare of its
citizens.''
1. Preemption Methodology in Cipollone
a. The Focus on Express Preemption
Justice Stevens declared that "the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act
and the 1969 Act is governed entirely by the express language in § 5 of
each Act."' 5 2 According to Justice Stevens, "[when a statute's express
preemption] provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent
with respect to state authority," 53 'there is no need to infer congressional
intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the
legislation."' 54 In other words, once Congress has expressly declared that
some aspect of state law is preempted, the Court must determine the
preemptive scope of the statute by examining the text of the statute itself,
along with its structure, legislative history and historical context, but should
not go beyond these factors in its analysis.' 55 The rationale for this
14" Id. at 544-48.
148 Id. at 517.
149 Id.
50 Id. at 518.
"'1 See id.
112 Id. at 517.
"' Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
114 Id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282
(1987)).
'5' See Stacey Allan Carroll, Note, Federal Preemption of State Products
Liability Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis
of Federal Preemption Defenses, 36 GA. L. REV. 797, 812-13 (2002).
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approach was similar to that of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"
namely that express demarcation of a statute's preemptive reach implies
that Congress does not intend to reach beyond that point. 156 Unfortunately,
two paragraphs later, Justice Stevens abandoned the rule he had just
announced and slipped, perhaps inadvertently, into an implied preemption
analysis.'57 Discussing the 1965 Act, Justice Stevens declared that "there
is no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning
requirements and the continued vitality of state common-law damages
actions."' 
58
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun,joined by Justices Kennedy
and Souter, agreed that the Court should not resort to implied preemption
analysis when the federal statute in question contained a provision which
expressly preempted state law. '59 Blackmun declared that the Court should
"resort to principles of implied pre-emption ... only when Congress has
been silent with respect to pre-emption." 160
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, offered a very different view
of the preemption doctrine. He would first look to the statutory language
for evidence of express preemption, giving words their "ordinary
meaning."'' Applying this approach, Justice Scalia concluded that the
plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim was expressly preempted by the 1965 Act
and that all of her common-law tort claims were expressly preempted by the
1969 Act.'62 However, unlike Justices Stevens and Blackmun, Justice
Scalia rejected the notion that the existence of an express preemption
provision precluded the Court from considering whether state law might be
impliedly preempted. 63 Justice Scalia conceded that the Court might
logically refuse to find that field preemption existed when a statute
contained an express preemption provision because the existence of such
a provision "tends to contradict any inference that Congress intended to
occupy a field broader than the statute's express language defines.""l6 In
cases of implied conflict, however, Justice Scalia believed that "the
Court's... new rule works mischief,"'165 particularly when combined with
156 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
1571 Id. at 518.
15g Id.
'59 Id. at 531-32.
'60 Id. at 532.
161 Id. at 548.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 547-48.




the Court's rule that preemption provisions should be narrowly
construed.166 According to Justice Scalia, if a statute said anything about
preemption, it would have to say everything because any ambiguity
concerning a statute's preemptive scope would be resolved in favor of
preserving state power.
1 67
Although Justice Scalia' s position did not prevail in the Cipollone case,
it eventually carried the day. The Court departed from Cipollone's "no
implied preemption" rule three years later in Myrick,168 and subsequently
employed implied preemption analysis in such cases as Geier,'
69
Buckman, 7 and Sprietsma17' after failing to find the existence of express
preemption.
b. The Presumption Against Preemption
Although each of the three opinions in Cipollone acknowledged that a
presumption against preemption existed, 72 the Justices disagreed about
whether the presumption was applicable in express preemption cases, and
they also disagreed about the role of such a presumption in statutory
interpretation.
i. Use of the Presumption in Express Preemption Cases
Justice Stevens and other members of the Court who joined in the
plurality opinion clearly thought that the presumption applied in express
preemption cases. In his discussion of the preemption language of the 1965
Act, Justice Stevens stated that the Court "must construe these provisions
in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power
regulations.' 73 Justice Blackmun agreed that the presumption was
applicable to express preemption analysis, declaring that "[t]he principles
of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the Court's
'66 See id. at 548.
167 Id.
16' Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995).
169 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-85 (2000).
170 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001).
171 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-69 (2002).
172 Justice Stevens mentioned the presumption a number of times in his plurality
opinion. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 522, 523, and 529 n.27. Justice
Blackmun also referred to the presumption several times. See id. at 532, 542.
Justice Scalia mentioned the presumption, though not favorably. See id. at 546.
17 3 Id. at 518.
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reluctance to find pre-emption where Congress has not spoken directly to
the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though
ambiguously."'
174
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued that the presumption against
preemption should not be applied in express preemption cases.'75 Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the presumption might be useful in implied preemp-
tion cases where it was not clear that Congress intended to preempt state
law at all, but he contended that the presumption was inappropriate when
there was "conclusive evidence of intent to pre-empt in the express words
of the statute itself, and the only remaining question is what the scope of
that pre-emption is meant to be."' 76 In Justice Scalia's view, the Court
should dispense with presumptions and apply "ordinary principles of
statutory construction" to determine how much state law Congress intended
to displace.'77
ii. Effect of the Presumption in Statutory Interpretation
The Justices took a different view of the effect of the presumption
against preemption in their various opinions. Justice Blackmun treated the
presumption as a "clear statement" rule which required Congress to clearly
express its intent to preempt state law and which construed any ambiguity
in the text of the statute in favor of the states.'78 For example, he stated that
"neither version of the federal legislation at issue here provides the kind of
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent necessary to displace state
common-law damages claims."' 7 9 Justice Blackmun also declared that
"[o]ur obligation to infer pre-emption only where Congress' intent is clear
and manifest mandates the conclusion that state common-law damages
actions are not pre-empted by the 1969 Act."' 80
On the other hand, Justice Stevens seemed to think that the presump-
tion against preemption required the Court to interpret preemptive language
narrowly. He declared that the presumption "reinforces the appropriateness
of a narrow reading of § 5 He also argued for a narrow reading of the
174 Id. at 533.
175 Id. at 545.
176 d.
177 id.
78 See id. at 531-32.
1
79 Id. at 531.




statutory text at several other places in the plurality opinion.'8 2 However,
Justice Stevens also purported to look to the "plain meaning" of the
statutory text, an approach that seems inconsistent with the "narrow"
reading that he had previously endorsed. For example, he claimed that "the
plain language of the pre-emption provision in the 1969 Act is much
broader" than that of the 1965 Act. 83 Later in the opinion, Justice Stevens
disagreed with Justice Blackmun's interpretation of the 1969 Act, arguing
that "such an analysis is at odds both with the plain words of the 1969 Act
and with the general understanding of common-law damages actions."' 84
Elsewhere in the opinion, he declared that "[w]e must give effect to this
plain language unless there is good reason to believe that Congress
intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning. 185
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, rejected the notion that the statutory
text should be narrowly construed in express preemption cases. 186 Instead,
he maintained that the Court should "interpret Congress's decrees of pre-
emption neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance with their apparent
meaning."'' 87 Later in his opinion, Justice Scalia repeated this admonition,
declaring that the Court should give statutory language "its ordinary
meaning."'' 88 The "ordinary meaning" advocated by Justice Scalia seems
remarkably similar to the "plain meaning" suggested earlier in Cipollone
by Justice Stevens.
2. The 1965 Act
All three opinions in Cipollone focused largely on the 1965 Act's
preemptive language. Section 5 of the Act was captioned "Preemption,"
182 Id. at 523 (declaring that the Court "must fairly but-in light of the strong
presumption against pre-emption--narrowly construe the precise language of §
5(b)"); id. at 529 (concluding that "the phrase 'based on smoking and health' fairly
but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not to make
fraudulent statements").
"'83 Id. at 520.
184 Id. at 521.
185 Id. at 521-22 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97
(1983)). Despite his support for a "plain meaning" approach, Justice Stevens seems
to have interpreted the 1969 Act's preemption provision somewhat more broadly
when he concluded that the phrase "[n]o requirement or prohibition.., shall be
imposed" preempted common-law tort claims based on failure to provide adequate
warnings. Id. at 515, 521-22.
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and section 5(a) provided that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and
health ...shall be required on any cigarette package."1"9 Section 5(b)
declared that "[n]o statement ... shall be required in the advertising of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with [section 4
of the 1965 Act]."' 9 In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens found that the
term "statement" was narrow and that section 5 merely prohibited state and
federal authorities from requiring manufacturers to put particular warnings
on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertisements.' 9 ' According to Justice
Stevens, this conclusion was reinforced by the 1965 Act's statement of
purpose, which expressed a desire to avoid "diverse, nonuniform, and
confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any
relationship between smoking and health."' 92 Finally, Justice Stevens relied
upon the "regulatory context" of the 1965 Act to support his conclusion
that section 5 preempted only affirmative regulations and not state law tort
claims. 93 Citing portions of the 1965 Act's legislative history,'94 Justice
Stevens determined that Congress added section 5 to the Act because it was
concerned with "a multiplicity of State and local regulations pertaining to
the labeling of cigarette packages."' 9' Consequently, he concluded that the
plaintiffs common-law claims were not preempted by the 1965 Act.
196
Justice Blackmun agreed that section 5 of the 1965 Act preempted only
state and local regulations and that this interpretation was consistent with
the Act's "stated purpose of avoiding 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations' relating to smoking and
health."' 97 On the other hand, Justice Scalia argued that the term "state-
ment" was sufficiently broad to preempt state law tort claims as well as
affirmative regulations.'9" First, he contended that Justice Stevens was
mistaken when he interpreted the language of section 5 only to prohibit
9 Id. at 514 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L.
89-92, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(2000))).
'9 Id. (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 5(b)).
' 'Id. at 518.
192 Id. at 519 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 2)
(alteration in original).
193 Id.
'94 H.R. REP. NO. 89-449 (1965).
'9' Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-499).
1
96 Id. at 519-20.
"9' Id. at 534 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 2)
(alteration in original).
'" Id. at 549-50.
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states from requiring cigarette manufacturers to place particular statements
on their products. He argued that section 5 should instead be read to
prohibit states from requiring cigarette manufacturers to place any
statement on their products.199 Justice Scalia also observed that the plurality
opinion's analysis of the particularity issue was difficult to reconcile with
its treatment of the word "requirement" in the 1969 Act, particularly when
the 1969 Act's statement of purpose was exactly the same as that of the
1965 Act.200
3. The 1969 Act
The Justices strongly disagreed about the preemptive scope of the 1969
Act. Section 5(a) of the 1969 Act declared that "[n]o statement relating to
smoking and health, other than the statement required by [section 4 of the
Act], shall be required on any cigarette package.""'' Section 5(b) of the
1969 Act provided that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter."2 2
Justice Stevens took the position that this language was much broader
than the preemptive language of the 1965 Act.2 3 He argued that the phrase
"requirement or prohibition[s]... imposed under State law" found in the
1969 Act was broader in scope than the term "statement" used in the 1965
Act.2 4 To support this conclusion, Justice Stevens abandoned his earlier
call for a "narrow interpretation" of preemptive language and looked
instead to the "plain words" and "plain language" of section 5 .02 He also
argued that because the petitioner's tort claims were predicated on the
existence of a legal duty under state law, judicial recognition of such tort
claims would impose "requirements or prohibitions" upon cigarette
manufacturers. 6 Justice Stevens further concluded that the phrase
"imposed under State law" was broad enough to include common-law
damage awards against cigarette manufacturers.20 7
'99 Id. at 549.200 Id. at 549-50.
201 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub- L. No. 91-222, § 5(a),
84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000)).202 Id. § 5(b).
203 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520.
204 id.
205 Id. at 521.
20 61 d. at 522.
207 See id.
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Having made these general conclusions about the preemptive effect of
the 1969 Act, Justice Stevens examined each of the plaintiffs tort claims
to see if they qualified as "requirements or prohibitions., 208 He determined
that the plaintiff s failure to warn claims were preempted to the extent that
they penalized manufacturers for failing to provide additional or more
specific warnings than those required by the federal cigarette labeling
statute.09 Justice Stevens found, however, that the Act did not preempt the
plaintiffs express warranty claims because, under warranty law, the state
did not impose a specific duty upon cigarette manufacturers regarding
product safety or quality.210 Rather, under warranty law, the manufacturers
imposed an obligation upon themselves when they made express warranties
to purchasers of their products.2 '
Justice Stevens upheld one of the plaintiffs claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation, but determined that the other claim was preempted. He
reasoned that the claim that cigarette manufacturers had neutralized the
effect of federally-mandated warnings through their advertising would be
preempted by section 5(b), because allowing such claims would impose a
state-law prohibition regarding advertising and promotion on cigarette
manufacturers.2t2 On the other hand, Justice Stevens upheld the plaintiffs
second claim, which alleged misrepresentation and concealment of material
facts by cigarette companies. 2 3 He pointed out that the preemptive effect
of section 5(b) did not include all state requirements or prohibitions against
cigarette manufacturers, but only those "based on smoking and health. '214
In this case, according to Justice Stevens, the plaintiffs claims were not
based on obligations relating specifically to smoking and health, but rather
were based "on a more general obligation.., not to deceive."215 In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that the Court should construe the
phrase "based on smoking and health" "fairly but narrowly" in light of the
presumption against preemption.21 6 Justice Stevens used the same reasoning
to uphold the plaintiffs claim of conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal
material facts concerning the health risks of smoking.1 7 Justice Stevens
208 Id. at 524.
209 Id.
2"' Id. at 525-27.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 527-28.
213 Id. at 528-29.
214Id. at 528-29 & n.26 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-566, at 12 (1969)).
215 Id. at 528-29.




contended that this claim was based on a general duty "not to conspire to
commit fraud," and not on a more specific state requirement based on
smoking and health.218
Justice Blackmun maintained that none of the plaintiff s claims should
be preempted by section 5(b) of the 1969 Act. 2' 9 He contended that the
phrase "no requirement or prohibition" was ambiguous and thus did not
clearly indicate a Congressional intent to preempt state law.220 Conse-
quently, if it employed a clear statement rule based on the presumption
against preemption, the Court would logically have no choice but to uphold
state authority.22' Furthermore, even the less rigorous "plain meaning"
approach did not justify preempting state law. As Justice Blackmun pointed
out, the dictionary definitions of "requirement" and "prohibition" were
strong evidence of their plain meaning and were consistent with affirmative
regulations, but not with common-law tort doctrines.222 Justice Blackmun
additionally distinguished Garmon by arguing that tort law normally
exercised a much weaker regulatory effect on affected parties than state
regulation and should therefore not be equated with it.223 Finally, Justice
Blackmun observed that nothing in the 1969 Act's legislative history
indicated a Congressional intent to preempt state tort law and leave injured
smokers without a remedy.224
Justice Scalia, however, asserted that the 1965 Act preempted the
plaintiff s failure to warn claims and that the 1969 Act preempted all of the
plaintiff's state-law tort claims.225 He reached this conclusion in part
because he rejected the notion that the statutory text should be interpreted
narrowly; instead, he argued that the words in section 5 of the 1965 Act
should be interpreted in accordance with their "ordinary meaning.2 26
According to Justice Scalia, both statutes preempted failure to warn claims
because they prohibited the states from imposing any liability upon
cigarette manufacturers based on the health-related content of their labeling
or advertising. 2 7 Additionally, Justice Scalia argued that the 1969 Act also
preempted state-law express warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation
218 id.
219 See id. at 531.
220 Id. at 535.
221 Id. at 542.
222 See id. at 535-36.
2231 d. at 536-37.
2241 d. at 541.
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claims.22' He concluded that express warranty claims were preempted
because state-law doctrines, not the cigarette manufacturers' voluntary
conduct, established the underlying obligation not to breach an express
warranty and provided the basis for imposing liability if such a breach
occurred. 229 Finally, Justice Scalia determined that the fraudulent misrepre-
sentation claims were preempted because there was no difference between
an affirmative duty to warn about the health risks of smoking and a duty not
to deceive the public about the nature of such risks.230
C. The Impact of Cipollone on Preemption Jurisprudence
The ground rules for preemption analysis set forth in Cipollone
represented a significant departure from earlier methodologies employed
by the Court.23 ' First, the Court declared that if a federal statute contained
express preemptive language, that language determined the preemptive
scope of the statute.232 Second, in light of the presumption against
preemption, the Court acknowledged that it would interpret preemptive
language narrowly.233 Third, the Court demonstrated a willingness to apply
its preemption analysis to state-law tort claims separately and
individually.3 Finally, the Court in Cipollone retreated somewhat from its
Garmon holding and acknowledged that common-law tort doctrines do not
always have the same regulatory effect as state legislative or administrative
enactments.235
Interestingly, the Cipollone Court abandoned the approach that it had
adopted eight years earlier in Silkwood when it held that Congress did not
intend to preempt punitive damages claims. The Silkwood Court reasoned
that Congress would not deprive injured parties of tort remedies without
declaring its intent to do so explicitly. 236 In Cipollone, however, the Court
concluded that tort remedies did not have to be mentioned specifically, but
could be preempted by more general preemptive language.237
22 Id. at 552, 554.
2291 d. at 551.
230 Id. at 552-53.
231 John F. McCauley, Note, Cipollone & Myrick: Deflating the Airbag
Preemption Defense, 30 IND. L. REV. 827, 843 (1997).
232 Jordan, supra note 37, at 1158.
233 Carroll, supra note 155, at 812.
234 Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A
Divided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1474 (1997).
235 See Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at 1412.
236 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
237 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 520-24 (1992).
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The preemption methodology adopted in Cipollone seems clear enough
on its face and should have been relatively easy to apply.238 This unfortu-
nately did not prove to be the case. In Cipollone, Justices Stevens and
Blackmun, ostensibly applying the same approach, reached diametrically
opposite conclusions about whether the phrase "requirement or prohibi-
tion ... imposed under State law' 239 included common-law tort doctrines.240
Moreover, instead of providing the lower courts with a helpful roadmap to
use in future preemption cases, Cipollone "marked the commencement of
a number of vacillating and confusing decisions in which the Supreme
Court was forced to balance federalism concerns with ambiguous congres-
sional language to determine whether a plaintiff's products liability claim
could proceed to trial."24'
III. A SURVEY OF PREEMPTION LAW SINCE CIPOLLONE
This section reviews several preemption cases decided by the Court
since Cipollone. It focuses on two aspects of the Cipollone opinion. First,
it focuses on the rule, announced by Justice Stevens in the plurality opinion
and accepted by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, that the Court
should rely only on express preemption analysis to determine the scope of
a federal statute's preemptive effect when the statute contains preemptive
language. The second issue is the role of the presumption against preemp-
tion in preemption litigation. Additionally, this section examines the
interaction between preemption clauses and saving clauses in federal
statutes. Finally, this section considers what weight the Court should give
to agency interpretations of preemptive language in their statutes and
regulations. While these latter two issues did not arise in Cipollone, they
have arisen with some frequency in subsequent preemption cases.
A. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
One year after Cipollone, the Court decided CSX Transportation, Inc.
v. Easterwood.242 This case involved a collision between a truck and a train
238 Hall, supra note 57, at 252.
239 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(a), 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §
1334 (2000))).
240 See Stem, supra note 92, at 1003.
241 Carroll, supra note 155, at 809.
242 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
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at a railroad crossing in Cartersville, Georgia.243 The truck driver's widow
alleged that the train company was negligent "for failing to maintain
adequate warning devices at the crossing and for operating the train at an
excessive speed. 244 The defendant argued that both of these claims were
preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA") 245 and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the
FRSA and the Federal Highway Safety Act of 1973.246 On appeal, the Court
held that the latter claim was preempted, but not the former.247
FRSA, as codified in 45 U.S.C. § 434, contained preemptive language
as well as a saving clause. Section 434 began with a statement of purpose,
which declared that "[l]aws, regulations, and orders relating to railroad
safety . . . shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable., 24" To
achieve this objective, the statute provided that states could adopt railroad
safety laws, rules, regulations, orders, or standards only when the Secretary
had not "adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject
matter of such State requirement., 249 The statute's saving clause, however,
provided that "[e]ven [when] federal standards [had] been promulgated, the
States [could] adopt more stringent safety requirements 'when necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard' as long as the state
regulations were "'not incompatible with' federal laws or regulations and
[did not impose] an undue burden on interstate commerce. '"250
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, 25' began with the
admonition that since FRSA contained an express preemption clause, the
Court must focus on this clause because it contained the best evidence of
congressional intent on the preemption question.252 The majority also
mentioned that "pre-emption will not lie unless it is 'the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress,"' '2" but declared a few sentences later that the Court
141 Id. at 661.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 663 (quoting Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-458,
84 Stat. 971 (repealed 1994)).
246 Id. (quoting Highway Safety Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 282
(1973) (codified as amended in 23 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
247 Id. at 676.
4845 U.S.C. § 434 (1970), repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 20, 106 (2002)).249 Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1970)).
25 0 Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1970)).
251 Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined in the majority opinion. Id. at 659-60.
252 Id. at 664.
253 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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should focus on "the plain wording" of the statute's preemption
provision.254 Additionally, citing the Cipollone case, Justice White
reaffirmed that common-law rules could be preempted by statutory
language that purported to preempt a state "law, rule, regulation, order, or
standard." '255 Finally, Justice White observed that FRSA preempted state
law only when the Secretary of Transportation adopted a rule, regulation,
order, or standard covering the same subject matter as a state
requirement.56 According to the Court, "covering" was a relatively
restrictive term that suggested that federal regulations would preempt only
if they "substantially subsume the subject matter of relevant state law." '257
The plaintiff's first claim involved the defendant's alleged failure to
place adequate warning devices at the crossing. Justice White observed that
the Secretary had promulgated several regulations applicable to states
which accepted federal aid.258 He concluded, however, that these regula-
tions were too general in nature to preempt state common law.259 According
to Justice White, the presumption against preemption partly supported this
finding.260 Justice White also observed that the Secretary had required
states to install grade crossing devices, including warning devices, that
conformed to standards set out in the Federal Highway Administration's
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways
("MUTCD").261 Justice White, however, determined that this requirement
did "not cover the subject matter of the tort law of grade crossings."262
Finally, the majority opinion examined two federal regulations requiring
the installation of particular warning devices at grade crossings, but found
those regulations inapplicable because the project in question had not been
constructed with federal funds.263
The plaintiffs second claim was that the defendant failed to operate its
train at a safe speed. 2' The Secretary had established a maximum speed
limit of sixty miles per hour for a class four track, the type of track that was





258 Id. at 665-66.
259 Id. at 667.
260 Id. at 668.
261 Id. at 665-66.
161 Id. at 668.
263 Id. at 670-73.
264 Id. at 673.
265 Id.
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exceeding this speed limit when the accident occurred, the plaintiff argued
that the train was nevertheless traveling too fast. The defendant maintained
that the plaintiffs claim was preempted by the federal speed limit
regulations.266
Justice White dismissed the argument that the speed limits merely
established a ceiling, leaving the states free to establish lower speed limits
for trains.267 Instead, Justice White concluded that the speed limit regula-
tions were connected with federal concerns about improving track and
grade crossing safety. 268 He also rejected the argument that FRSA's saving
clause protected common-law negligence claims from preemption. 269 The
saving clause provided that a state could enact or continue in force "an
additional or more stringent law ...relating to railroad safety when
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard. 270
Justice White determined that the saving clause did not apply because
common-law negligence was concerned with risks and hazards in general
and not merely limited to those caused by unique local conditions. 27'
Accordingly, Justice White concluded that the plaintiffs excessive speed
claim was preempted.272
Justice Thomas argued that neither claim should be preempted.273 He
maintained that the federal speed limits were not connected in any way with
grade crossing safety and, therefore, the states were free to address this
problem.274 Justice Thomas also indicated that the presumption against
preemption applied to actions by administrative agencies and suggested that
the Secretary define more explicitly the subject matter to be covered in the
speed limit regulation.275
The Easterwood Court adhered fairly closely to the approach it had
adopted in Cipollone.276 A novel issue in Easterwood was the effect of a
saving clause on common-law claims. The Court merely took notice of the
saving clause, however, and concluded that it did not apply to negligence
claims based on excessive speed.
266 id.
267 See id. at 674.
261 Id. at 674-75.
269 Id. at 675.
27 Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1970)).
271 id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 676.
274 Id. at 677-78.
275 Id. at 679.
276 Noah, supra note 6, at 920.
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B. Freightliner Corporation v. Myrick
In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,2" decided in 1995, the Court held that
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("NTMVSA") did not
expressly 278 or impliedly preempt a common-law design defect claim
against truck manufacturers who failed to equip their vehicles with antilock
braking systems ("ABS"). 279 In that case, one plaintiff was killed and
another was injured in two separate but similar accidents when eighteen-
wheel tractor-trailers struck their vehicles.28" The plaintiffs alleged that the
tractor-trailers were defectively designed because they were not equipped
with ABS.281 The truck manufacturers responded that the NTMVSA 282 and
its implementing regulations preempted the plaintiffs' state-law tort
claims.283
Justice Thomas, joined by seven other members of the Court,284
rejected the manufacturers' preemption defense.285 The Safety Act
contained an express preemption clause prohibiting states and cities from
enacting motor vehicle safety standards that were not identical to applicable
federal standards. 286 This preemption provision, however, did not specifi-
cally mention common-law claims.287 Additionally, the NTMVSA had a
saving clause stating that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law., 288 The defendants argued that
Standard 121, which "imposed stopping distances and vehicle stability
requirements for trucks," but did not require the installation of ABS,
277 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
278 Id. at 286-87 (no express preemption).
279 Id. at 289-90 (no implied preemption).
280 Id. at 282.
281 Id. at 283.
282 National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (1966) (repealed 1994) [hereinafter NTMVSA].
283 Myrick, 514 U.S. at 283.
284 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the opinion. Justice Scalia did not join in the
opinion, but concurred in the result. Id. at 281.
285 Id. at 282.
286 Id. at 284 (quoting NTMVSA § 103(d) (original version at 15 U.S.C. §
1392(d) (1988), current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30,103(b)(1) (2000))).
287 See McCauley, supra note 231, at 831.
288 Myrick, 514 U.S. at 284 (quoting NTMVSA (original version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1397(k) (1988), current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30,103(e) (2000))).
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expressly preempted the plaintiffs' claims. 89 Justice Thomas, however,
pointed out that truck manufacturers had successfully challenged the
validity of the original Standard 121 in the mid-1970s 29" but that the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") had failed to
promulgate a new regulation.29 ' According to Justice Thomas, since
Standard 121 had no legal force or preemptive effect, the Act's saving
clause freely permitted states to impose their own safety standards.292
The defendant maintained that NHTSA's failure to adopt a standard for
stopping distances meant that regulation by state or federal entities was
inappropriate.293 However, the Court rejected this argument, pointing out
that NHTSA's failure to regulate in this area was not due to an affirmative
decision, but rather from a successful lawsuit brought against the agency
by the automobile industry.9
Undoubtedly, the most significant aspect of the majority opinion in
Myrick was its apparent retreat from the rule in Cipollone that excluded
implied preemption analysis when a statute contained express preemptive
language.295 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' lawsuits were
impliedly preempted due to an actual conflict between design defect claims
and federal regulatory objectives in this area.296 The Court of Appeals
followed the Court's directions in Cipollone and held that there could be
no implied preemption when Congress placed an express preemption
provision in a statute.297 The Myrick Court, however, declared that
Cipollone had not proclaimed a "categorical rule precluding the coexistence
of express and implied pre-emption., '298 The Court, instead, did nothing
more than suggest that the existence of an express preemption clause
"supports a reasonable inference.., that Congress did not intend to pre-
empt other matters. 299 Justice Thomas determined that the Safety Act did
not impliedly preempt the plaintiffs common-law claims.3"' Absent any
federal safety standard regarding stopping distances or braking systems for
289 Id. at 284-86.
290 Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978).
291 Myrick, 514 U.S. at 285-86.
292 Id. at 286.
293 See id.
294 Id. at 286-87.
295 Carroll, supra note 155, at 813-14.
296 Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287.
29 7Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1524 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
298 Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288.
299 Id. at 288.
300 Id. at 289-90.
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trucks, there could be no discernible federal regulatory objectives
undermined in this area."' Consequently, there could be no conflict
between design defect claims and these nonexistent federal objectives.0 2
Myrick did not break any new ground conceptually. The Court did not
pay attention to the Safety Act's saving clause,0 3 and its analysis of the
statute's preemption provision was relatively conventional. Myrick's
primary significance was its repudiation of Cipollone's "no implied
preemption" rule.3"
C. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, °5 decided in 1996, held that common-law
negligence claims against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
pacemaker were not preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 ("MDA")306 to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA"). °7 The plaintiff in Medtronic, a heart patient, required emer-
gency surgery when her cardiac pacemaker failed.30 8 She brought suit
against the manufacturer for defective manufacture and design, as well as
failure to warn.3"9 According to the plaintiffs physician, a defect in the
pacemaker's Model 4011 lead caused it to malfunction.310 In response, the
manufacturer claimed that section 360k(a) of the MDA311 expressly
preempted all of the plaintiff's claims. 1 2 Section 360k(a) declared that no
state could
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement-
301 Id.
302 Noah, supra note 6, at 924.
303 See Hall, supra note 57, at 262.
3' Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at 1463.
315 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
306 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2000)).
307 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 503 (citing the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2000)). The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not
expressly preempt product liability claims because it does not have a preemption
provision. See Owen, supra note 4, at 428.
308 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480-81.
309 Id. at 481.
310 Id. at 480-81. "The lead is the portion of [the] pacemaker that transmits [an]
electrical signal from the 'pulse generator' to the heart." Id. at 480.
311 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1995).
312Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 481-82.
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(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter.
3 13
The MDA required approval by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") before medical devices, such as catheters, artificial heart valves,
defibrillators, and pacemakers, could be marketed." 4 The MDA classified
medical devices into three categories based on their capacity to cause harm.
Class HI encompassed the most dangerous medical devices,3"' including
pacemakers.3"6 Before a Class III device manufacturer could market its
product, it had to provide the FDA with a "reasonable assurance" that the
device was safe and effective.317 This involved submitting the product to
the FDA's premarket approval ("PMA") procedure. 318 This process was
lengthy and expensive. MDA, however, exempted existing or "predicate"
medical devices from being withdrawn from the market during the PMA
process. 32' Additionally, devices that were substantially equivalent to
predicate devices321 were exempted from having to go through the PMA
process.322 Instead, the manufacturer of an exempted device merely had to
submit a "premarket notification" to the FDA.323 This process, also known
as a "section 510(k) process," typically took less than 20 hours for the FDA
to complete, as opposed to the 1200 hours that could be required for a PMA
review.324 Medtronic successfully claimed that its Model 4011 lead was
"substantially equivalent" to a pre-existing device, and it was approved for
marketing by the FDA after a section 510(k) review.325
113 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
314 Id. § 360c (1995).
315 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (1995)).
316 Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610).
317 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)).
318 Id.
319 For a discussion of the FDA approval process see Jonathan Kahan,
Premarket Approval versus Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same
Market, 39 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 510, 514-15 (1984); Kirk, supra note 13, at
679-81.320 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477-48 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)).
321 Id. at 478 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B)).
322 id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 478-79.
3251 d. at 480.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg,
wrote the plurality opinion and Justice Breyer wrote a concurring
opinion.326 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote an opinion which concurred and
dissented.327 Justice Stevens began by citing Cipollone for the proposition
that the Court could determine the MDA's preemptive scope by examining
the language of § 360k(a).328 Justice Stevens also invoked Cipollone to
support his conclusion that the Court's interpretation of the statutory text
should take account of the presumption against preemption and reflect a
"fair understanding of congressional purpose."
329
With this in mind, Justice Stevens considered Medtronic's contention
that any common-law claim constituted a "requirement" within the meaning
of § 360k(a) because it would impose duties upon the manufacturer that
were "different from, or in addition to" those imposed by the FDA.33 °
Justice Stevens characterized this argument as "unpersuasive" and
"implausible" because it would leave consumers without any remedy if
they were injured by a defective medical device.331 Quoting from the
Silkwood case, Justice Stevens declared that if Congress wished to take
away state-law remedies, it would have to express itself more clearly.332
Ironically, in light of Cipollone, Justice Stevens opined that "requirement"
was a "singularly odd word" for Congress to use if it wanted "to preclude
common-law claims. 333 Justice Stevens, nevertheless, tried to reconcile
this with the Court's Cipollone holding. He argued that it was appropriate
to conclude in Cipollone that the term "requirement" included common-law
tort actions because the 1969 Cigarette Labeling Act preempted only a
narrow class of claims and, therefore, would not have seriously interfered
with important state interests.33 ' Finally, Justice Stevens relied on the
MDA's legislative history to support his conclusion that it did not preempt
all common-law claims.
335
326 Id. at 474, 503.
327 Id. at 509.
328 Id. at 484.
329 Id. at 485-86 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530
(1992)) (emphasis in original).
330 Id. at 486.
331 Id. at 487.
332 See id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 488.
335Id. at 490-91.
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Justice Stevens then considered whether § 360k(a) of the MDA 336
preempted any specific claims. 37 Regarding the plaintiff's defective design
claim, he concluded that the FDA focused more on equivalence than safety
in its 510(k) process; since the agency's requirements were not related to
the safety of the product's design, there was no overlap between them and
the standards applicable to manufacturers under state tort law.33' Accord-
ingly, Justice Stevens found that the plaintiff s design defect claim was not
expressly preempted.
Next, Justice Stevens determined whether § 360k(a) preempted the
plaintiffs claims based on defective manufacturing or inadequate
labeling.339 This portion of the plurality opinion considered three issues: (1)
whether § 360k(a) preempted the manufacturing or labeling claims based
on a manufacturer's conduct that violated FDA regulations; (2) whether §
360k(a) preempted manufacturing or labeling claims because tort law
incorporated liability standards not identical to applicable federal require-
ments; and (3) whether § 360k(a) preempted common-law tort claims in
cases where manufacturers had complied with FDA requirements of general
applicability which established federal standards regarding manufacturing
and labeling.
The defendant argued that § 360k(a) preempted manufacturing and
labeling claims based on conduct that violated an applicable FDA
regulation.34 ° The defendant reasoned that the states created a parallel
enforcement regime that relied on damage awards rather than administra-
tive sanctions for violations of FDA regulations.341 Justice Stevens,
however, disagreed with the defendant, concluding instead that the
availability of a damages remedy under state law did not impose any
additional substantive requirement upon product manufacturers who
violated FDA regulations, but merely subjected violators to additional
liability.342 Justice Stevens also rejected the notion that § 360k(a) pre-
empted state tort law because injured parties who brought tort claims often
had to prove additional elements, such as negligence, in order to recover
against those who violated FDA regulations. He concluded that "such
336 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a) (1995).
337 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 492.
338 Id. at 492-94.






additional elements of the state-law cause of action would make the state
requirements narrower, not broader, than the federal requirement." '343
Justice Stevens acknowledged that his interpretation was "substantially
informed" by FDA regulations which interpreted the scope of § 360k(a)'s
preemptive scope.344 The applicable regulations stated that § 360k(a) "does
not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially
identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act., 345 According to
Justice Stevens, the FDA was "uniquely qualified to determine whether a
particular form of state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ... and,
therefore, whether it should be preempted.
346
Justice Stevens then turned to the question of whether FDA regulations
of general applicability were sufficient to preempt common-law claims.
One set of regulations required manufacturers of medical devices to include
a label with each device that contained "information for use ... and any
relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions .. .
Another set of regulations required manufacturers to comply with "good
manufacturing practices," which are described by the FDA in considerable
detail. 34" The Court of Appeals ruled that all of the plaintiff s manufactur-
ing and labeling claims were preempted because they would interfere with
the consistent application of these regulations.349 Justice Stevens, relying
on the text of § 360k(a) and 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d), concluded that these
claims would not be preempted unless certain conditions were met.
Based on the language of the statute, Justice Stevens found that the
federal requirement must be applicable to the device in question to preempt
state law. 350 Furthermore, in 21 C.F.R. § 808. 1(d) this meant that preemp-
tion would not occur unless the FDA established "specific counterpart
regulations or ... other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device. 35' Section 808. 1(d)(1) indicated that Congress did not intend for
§ 360k(a) "to preempt 'State or local requirements of general applicability
343 Id.
344 id.
14121 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2) (1995).
346 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
14' 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(b), (c).
348 See id. § 820.
349 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 56 F.3d 1335, 1350 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
350 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 499.
"' Id. at 498 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)).
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where the purpose of the requirement relates ...to other products in
addition to devices .... 352 This suggested to Justice Stevens that the
FDA's manufacturing and labeling requirements reflected "important but
entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the sort of
concerns regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the
statute or regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradic-
tory state requirements. '353 Consequently, Justice Stevens concluded that
the MDA did not expressly preempt any of the plaintiff's claims based on
"defective manufacturing or labeling. ..."354
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer expressed his support for
Cipollone's finding that the term "requirement" could refer to a duty
imposed upon product manufacturers by principles of state tort law. 355 He
also endorsed the proposition that the Court should defer to a federal
agency's determination of the preemptive effect of a statute or regulation.356
Justice Breyer agreed that the FDA could exercise its preemptive power in
a narrow manner if it wished.357 Finally, he engaged in an implied
preemption analysis and concluded that (1) the FDA had not occupied the
entire field of medical device regulation and (2) state tort law did not
threaten to conflict with the FDA's regulatory objectives in this area.358
Justice O'Connor also embraced the Cipollone Court's finding that
common-law tort actions could impose "requirements" on product
manufacturers. 9 While she agreed that § 360k(a) did not preempt the
plaintiff's design defect claims or any claims based on conduct that violated
FDA regulations, 360 Justice O'Connor concluded that some of the plaintiff s
common-law claims imposed state requirements upon the defendant that
were "different from, or in addition to" FDA requirements.36' Moreover,
she expressed considerable skepticism about the practice of relying on
agency interpretations of statutory preemption provisions and exclaimed
that "[w]here the language of the statute is clear, resort to the agency's
352 Id. at 499.
353 Id. at 501.
354 Id. at 502.
355 Id. at 504 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)).
3 56 Id. at 505--06.
357 Id. at 506-07.
35 Id. at 507-08.
359 Id. at 510. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas.
360 Id. at 513.
3611 Id. at 514.
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interpretation is improper. 362 Justice O'Connor objected to the FDA's
attempt to limit the preemptive scope of § 360k(a) by adopting regulations
that preempted state law only when a conflict existed between a specific
state requirement and a specific federal requirement.363
In some respects, the Medtronic decision represents a return to the
principles set forth in Cipollone. First, most of the Justices focused
primarily on the language of § 360k(a) and avoided an implied preemption
analysis. 36 Additionally, Justice Stevens referred to the presumption
against preemption, although he did not rely on this principle to narrowly
interpret the statutory language. 365 Finally, a majority of the Court endorsed
the notion that common-law tort actions could impose requirements on
affected parties that were different from requirements imposed by federal
law.
366
D. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin367 involved the same federal
statute as Easterwood.3 68 The Court in Shanklin, however, concluded that
the FRSA preempted the plaintiff s common-law tort claim. 369 In Shanklin,
the plaintiff's husband was killed at a railroad crossing at Oakwood Church
Road in western Tennessee. 370 The plaintiff alleged that the warning signs
installed at the crossing did not provide an adequate warning to
motorists. 3 1 "At the time of the accident, the Oakwood Church Road
crossing was equipped with advance warning signs and... [the] black-and-
white, X-shaped signs that read 'RAILROAD CROSSING.' 37 2 Federal
regulations required that some crossings, but not the one at Oakwood
Church Road, be equipped with "'automatic gates with flashing lights.'
37 3
The railroad argued that the plaintiffs claim was preempted by
FRSA. 374 As mentioned earlier,375 FRSA contained an express preemption
362 Id. at 512.
363 Id. at 511-12.
31 Madden, supra note 4, at 147-48.
365 Davis, supra note 4, at 1003; see also Carroll, supra note 155, at 814.
366 Davis, supra note 4, at 1003.
367 Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
36 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
369 Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 347.
370 Id. at 347, 350.
371 Id. at 347.
372 Id. at 350.
113 Id. at 349 (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) (1999)).374 Id. at 350-51.
375 See supra text accompanying notes 248-52.
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provision declaring that regulations and orders promulgated by the
Secretary of Transportation would displace state law if they covered the
same subject matter as the state requirement.376 As Justice O'Connor
observed, the Federal Highway Administration had issued regulations
pursuant to the Crossings Program which established design standards for
grade crossings and set forth requirements for warning devices installed
under the program.377 In Easterwood, the Court had ruled that common-law
tort claims based on the inadequacy of crossing signals would not be
preempted by this statutory provision when the federal government had not
provided funding for the project.378 The warning devices in Shanklin were
installed with federal funds and complied with applicable federal
standards.379 Affirming the Court's Easterwood ruling, Justice O'Connor
concluded that these regulations established requirements regarding the
installation of particular warning devices and thus preempted tort actions
that challenged the adequacy of these devices. °
Justice Ginsburg argued that federal regulations provided only
minimum, rather than adequate, standards for warning devices at railroad
grade crossings and, therefore, left the states free to make their own
decisions about the adequacy of such devices.38" ' According to Justice
Ginsburg, the Court's decision in Easterwood merely held that federal
funding for a project was a necessary prerequisite to preemption, but that
it did not automatically result in preemption of state law. 82
The Court's Shanklin decision was largely consistent with its earlier
holding in Easterwood. The majority confined itself to an express
preemption analysis.383 The Shanklin Court, in contrast to Easterwood,
made no reference to the presumption against preemption. Justice
O'Connor instead pointed out that the "[s]tates [concerned about the
adequacy of existing devices] are free to install more protective
devices.., with their own funds." '384 Additionally, Justice O'Connor made
it clear that Congress had the power to confer a "windfall" on railroads, by
paying for safety devices at grade crossings while simultaneously exempt-
ing railroads from tort liability.385
37649 U.S.C. § 20,106 (2000).
... Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 348-49.
37 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 673 (1993).
... Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 350.
380 Id. at 359.
381 Id. at 360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
382 Id. at 361 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
383 Davis, supra note 4, at 1004.




The most significant aspect of the opinion in Shanklin is its rather
unsympathetic response to FHWA's interpretation of its own regulations.
In Easterwood, FHWA had argued in an amicus curiae brief that C.F.R. § §
646.214(b)(3) and 646,214(b)(4) "'establishe[d] substantive standards for
what constitutes adequate safety devices [at] grade crossing improvement
projects financed with federal funds. ' ' 386 FHWA also declared that
"warning devices in place at a crossing improved with the use of federal
funds have, by definition, been specifically found to be adequate under a
regulation issued by the Secretary." '387 Furthermore, the agency unequivo-
cally stated that "[a]ny state rule that more or different crossing devices
were necessary at a federally funded crossing is therefore preempted. 388
However, FHWA changed its position when Shanklin reached the
Supreme Court. The agency contended in its amicus curiae brief that the
Crossings Program was divided into a "minimum protection" program and
a "priority" or "hazard" program.389 The disbursement of federal funds in
connection with the "minimum protection" program did not involve any
judgment on the agency's part about whether the warning devices were
adequate. 39 "Under the 'priority' or 'hazard' program, in contrast,
diagnostic teams conduct individualized assessments of particular
crossings, and state or FHWA officials make specific judgments about the
adequacy of the warning devices using the criteria set out in §
646.2 14(b)(3). '391 Under this interpretation, state law would be preempted
only in "priority" or "hazard" programs where a diagnostic team had
actually determined that particular warning devices were needed.392
While acknowledging that an administrative agency's interpretation of
its own regulations is generally "'entitled to substantial deference,'
39 3
Justice O'Connor declared that "no such deference is appropriate here." '394
386 Id. at 354 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 23, CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) (Nos. 91-790 and 91-1206)).
387 Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 24, Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658 (1993)).
... Id. at 354-55 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 24,
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 ).
389 Id. at 355 (quoting Brief of Ainici Curiae United States at 15-21, Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (No. 99-312)).
39 Id. (citing BriefofAmici Curiae United States at 15-21, Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344 (2000) (No. 99-312)).
39' Id. (citing BriefofAmici Curiae United States at 34-35, Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344 (2000) (No. 99-312)).
3 9 2 
id.
311 Id. at 356 (quoting Lyne v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)).
394 id.
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She also explained that "'[o]nce [the Court] determined a statute's clear
meaning, [it would] adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare
decisis,"' even though the agency subsequently offered a different
interpretation. 395 Accordingly, the Court stood by its earlier interpretation
of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and 646.214(b)(4), notwithstanding FHWA's change
of heart.
E. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
The Court decided Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. in the same
year as Shanklin.396 Resolving a longstanding controversy,3 97 the Geier
Court held that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 ("FMVSS
208"), 391 promulgated under the authority of the NTMVSA,399 preempted
design defect claims against automobile manufacturers who failed to equip
their vehicles with airbags. °° Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, wrote the majority
opinion.4"' Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, issued a dissenting opinion." 2
The plaintiff in Geier struck a tree while driving her 1987 Honda
Accord. 403 Even though she used lap and shoulder seatbelts, the plaintiff
395 Id. (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,
131 (1990)).
396 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
397 See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1997); Montag v.
Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996); Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902
F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990); Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11 th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Kitts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 875 F.2d
787 (10th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988);
Munroe v. Galati, 938 P.2d 1114 (Ariz. 1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327
(Ind. 1995); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995); Drattel v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1998); Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,
Inc., 684 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio 1997); see also Keith C. Miller, Deflating the Airbag
Preemption Controversy, 37 EMORY L.J. 897 (1988); Theroff, supra note 44, at
577.
3 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (July 17, 1984).
9 NTMVSA, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (current version in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
40 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
401 Id. at 863.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 865.
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was seriously injured." 4 The automobile "was not equipped with airbags
or other passive restraint devices,"4 5 and the plaintiff claimed that the
manufacturer's failure to provide a driver's side airbag constituted a design
defect.4°6 Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court concluded
that the plaintiffs design defect claim was preempted.40 7
The NTMVSA expressly preempted "any safety standard" established
by a state which was "applicable to the same aspect of performance of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment" unless it was identical to the
federal standard.40 8 The NTMVSA also contained a saving clause which
declared that compliance with a federal safety standard would not "exempt
a person from liability [under] common law., 40 9 In 1984, the Department
of Transportation ("DOT") had promulgated a safety standard, FMVSS
208,410 which "required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of
their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. 41 ' The defendant had installed
the passive restraints in at least ten percent of its 1987 models, thus
complying with FMVSS 208.412
Justice Breyer first examined the text of the Safety Act's express
preemption clause. He acknowledged that the preemptive language in 15
U.S.C. § 1392(d), standing alone, could be interpreted to include common-
law tort actions.413 However, he suggested that the existence of a saving
clause might require the Court to interpret § 1392(d) more narrowly.41 4
Reading the two provisions together, Justice Breyer reasoned that a federal
safety standard would not expressly preempt state tort law because that
standard established only automobile safety minimum requirements.4 5
Consequently, he concluded that the plaintiff s design defect claim was not
preempted.416
Justice Breyer then discussed whether the plaintiffs tort claims were




407 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
408 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30,103(b)
(2003)).
4
09Id. § 1397(k) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30,103(e) (2003)).
410 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (July 17, 1984).
411 Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-65.
412 Id. at 890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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whether the existence of a saving clause prevented the Court from
considering the possibility of conflict preemption." 7 Justice Breyer
declared that the Court had repeatedly refused to interpret saving clauses
broadly "where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme
established by federal law."4t 8 The express preemption provision and the
saving provision, "read together, reflect[ed] a neutral policy...
toward ... conflict preemption. '419
Justice Breyer reviewed the complex history of FMVSS 208 and
concluded that design defect claims based on failure to install airbags
would conflict with the DOT's regulatory objectives.420 FMVSS 208 was
designed to provide automobile manufacturers with "a range of choices
among different passive restraint devices. 4 21 The DOT believed that it was
desirable to phase in passive restraint devices gradually over time in order
to "lower costs, overcome technical safety problems, encourage technologi-
",422cal development, and win widespread consumer acceptance ....
Justice Breyer showed considerable deference to the DOT's interpreta-
tion of FMVSS 208's objectives and its conclusion that common-law tort
actions constituted an obstacle "to the accomplishment and execution" of
the safety standard's regulatory objectives. 423 He pointed out that the
"subject matter [was] technical; and the relevant history and background
[were] complex... the [DOT] [w]as likely to have a thorough understand-
ing of its own regulations and their objectives and [was] 'uniquely
qualified' to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements" on its
regulatory scheme.424 For these reasons, Justice Breyer declared, "the
agency's own views should make a difference. 425 Justice Breyer rejected
the dissent's suggestion that the Court should not allow an administrative
regulation to preempt state law on conflict preemption grounds unless the
agency issued a formal statement that a conflict existed.426
411 Id. at 869.
41
1 Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)).
419 Id. at 870-7 1.
420 Id. at 874-75.
421 Id. at 875.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 883 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 25-26, Geier v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-1811)).
424 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996)).
425 Id.
426 Id. at 885 ("To insist on a specific expression of agency intent to pre-empt,
made after notice-and-comment rulemaking, would be in certain cases to tolerate
conflicts that an agency.., is most unlikely to have intended.")
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Justice Stevens, joined by three other members of the Court, wrote a
vigorous dissent. He agreed that the Safety Act did not "expressly preempt
common-law claims. 427 While conceding that the Court had preempted
common-law claims in Cipollone,4 28 Easterwood,4 29 and Medtronic,43
Justice Stevens argued that those statutes' preemptive language was
broader than that of § 1392(d), and the statutes involved in these other
cases did not contain saving provisions.4 3' Furthermore, since "the term,
'safety standard,' as used [elsewhere in the statute] ...refers to an
objective rule prescribed by a legislature or an administrative agency,
'4 32
Justice Stevens maintained that it must have the same meaning in §
1392(d).433 This interpretation was bolstered by the presumption against
preemption,4 34 a concept that the majority opinion ignored. 35
Justice Stevens also concluded that the common-law claims did not
frustrate the regulatory objectives of FMVSS 208.436 First, he expressed
doubt that automobile manufacturers would be pressured by "no airbag"
design defect claims to install airbags instead of other passive restraints in
their vehicles.437 Second, the phase-in period contemplated by FMVSS
would have passed by the time manufacturers actually equipped all of their
vehicles with airbags. 438 Finally, FMVSS 208, like all other regulations
promulgated under the auspices of the Safety Act, established "minimum,
rather than fixed or maximum, requirements. 439
Justice Stevens proposed that the Court refrain from allowing
administrative agencies to preempt common-law tort claims unless they
openly discussed the preemptive effect of proposed orders and regulations
during the rulemaking process. 44' According to Justice Stevens:
427 Id. at 899.
428 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
429 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
430 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
431 Geier, 529 U.S. at 897-98.
432 Id. at 896.
433 Id.
434 Id. at 894.
431 Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against Preemption?, 17
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 8-9 (2002) [hereinafter Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial
Sleight of Hand].
436 Geier, 529 U.S. at 900-03.
437 Id. at 901.
438 Id. at 901-02.
439 Id. at 903.
441Id. at 912.
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Requiring the Secretary to put his pre-emptive position through formal
notice-and-comment rulemaking-whether contemporaneously with the
promulgation of the allegedly pre-emptive regulation or at any later time
that the need for pre-emption becomes apparent--respects both the
federalism and nondelegation principles that underlie the presumption
against preemption in the regulatory context and the APA's requirement
of new rulemaking when an agency substantially modifies its interpreta-
tion of a regulation.44'
The majority rejected this proposal.442
The Geier case prompts several observations. First, the majority
opinion failed to mention the presumption against preemption and instead
relied heavily on elusive "ordinary pre-emption principles" to interpret the
statutory text.443 Second, the majority opinion suggested that the saving
clause militated against a broad reading of the Safety Act's preemption
provision and supported instead a narrow interpretation.444 Curiously, the
majority did not allow the saving clause to prevent it from engaging in a
conflict preemption analysis once it concluded that the Act did not
expressly preempt state law.445 Instead, the court concluded that the saving
clause and the express preemption clause neutralized each other, leaving
the Court free to search for preemption outside the statutory text.446 Third,
the majority opinion seems to have followed the Myrick447 approach by
engaging in an implied preemption analysis even though it had earlier
determined that the Safety Act did not expressly preempt common-law
claims. 448 Finally, the majority opinion showed considerable respect for the
DOT's opinion about the FMVSS's regulatory objectives, dismissing the
notion that administrative agencies might have a greater responsibility than
Congress to speak clearly when they wished to trump state law.449
44id.
'2 Id. at 884. See also supra notes 423-426 and accompanying text.
443 Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 435, at 8-9.
44 Kirk, supra note 13, at 678.
" Hall, supra note 57, at 269 (observing that Geier "presents a logical
difficulty in understanding why the saving clause would save the common-law
action from the express preemption provision but not from implied preemption
analysis").
446 Carroll, supra note 155, at 817.
447 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
44' Carroll, supra note 155, at 816-17.
449 Alexander Haas, Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies Through Pre-




F. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'Legal Committee was decided by the Court
in 2001 .450 The plaintiffs in that case were injured by surgical bone screws
manufactured by AcroMed Corporation.451 They alleged that the manufac-
turer and its consultant, the Buckman Company, made fraudulent represen-
tations to the FDA to obtain FDA permission to market its product, a Class
III medical device.452 According to the plaintiffs, AcroMed utilized the §
510(k) process 453 to obtain FDA approval to market the screws as
"substantially equivalent" devices by claiming that they would be used in
the long bones of the arms and legs when, in reality, the company intended
to market them principally for use in spinal fusion surgery.454
The Buckman Court held that Medical Device Amendments to the
FDCA impliedly preempted the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-agency claims.455
Contrasting its approach in Geier, the Buckman Court acknowledged the
existence of a presumption against preemption.456 It ultimately concluded,
however, that the issue involved in Buckman was inherently federal in
character and that states had no interest in protecting the FDA against
fraudulent representations by license applicants.457
Curiously, the Court did not explicitly consider whether the plaintiffs'
fraud-on-the-agency claim was expressly preempted, but instead focused
exclusively on implied preemption.458 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist affirmed the position adopted in Geier "that neither an
express preemption provision nor a saving clause 'bars the ordinary
450 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). Buckman
resolved the circuit split on the issue of fraud-on-the agency claims. See, e.g.,
Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216,233-36 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that MDA
expressly preempted fraud-on-the-agency claims); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Prod. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1998) (declaring that fraud-on-the-
agency claims were not expressly or impliedly preempted), rev'd sub. nom.
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Reeves v.
AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that fraud-on-the-agency
claims were preempted).
451 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 345. See supra notes 317-25 and accompanying text for a description
of the § 510(k) process.
414 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 346.
411 Id. at 348.
456 Id. at 347-48 ("[N]o presumption against pre-emption obtains in this case.").
457 Id.
45' Kirk, supra note 13, at 687.
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working of conflict pre-emption principles.' , 459 According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, a conflict existed between common-law tort claims like the
plaintiffs' and the FDA's need to balance a number of regulatory objec-
tives.460 Section 510(k)'s disclosure requirements and the wide range of
enforcement options available to the FDA to detect and punish fraudulent
applications helped achieve the objective of protecting the integrity of the
licensing process.46' However, the FDA had to balance this protection with
the objectives of not slowing down the introduction of new medical
products into the market and not interfering with the judgment of health
care professionals.462 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that
allowing private persons to bring fraud-on-the-agency claims against
manufacturers of medical devices would greatly increase licensing costs for
both applicants and the FDA.463 He also emphasized that the claims
involved were not ordinary tort claims, as in Medtronic, but instead were
based entirely on noncompliance with FDA disclosure requirements. 46 He
therefore rejected the Medtronic argument that any violation of the FDCA
would support a common-law tort claim.465
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens concluded that the plaintiffs' case
should be dismissed on causation grounds.466 The plaintiffs claimed that the
FDA would not have approved the bone screw if the manufacturer had
made a full disclosure on its license application and, consequently,
"plaintiffs would not have been injured. 467 In fact, the FDA had allowed
the product to stay on the market after the manufacturer's fraud was
revealed, suggesting that the product would have reached the market even
if there had been no fraud.468 As far as preemption was concerned, Justice
Stevens argued that there was no conflict between fraud-on-the-agency
claims and the FDA's regulatory objectives. 469 In his view, tort claims
"would not encroach upon, but rather would supplement and facilitate, the
federal enforcement scheme. 470 Justice Stevens observed that preempting
4" Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
460 Id. at 348.
461 Id. at 348-49.
462 Id. at 349-50.
463 Id. at 350-51.
464 Id. at 352-53.
465 Id. at 353.
466 id.
467 Id. at 343.
468 Id. at 353-54.
46




such claims would leave victims of fraud without a remedy.47' Echoing the
Court's language in Silkwood, Justice Stevens expressed doubt "that
Congress intended such a harsh result. 472
The Buckman case is interesting in two respects. First, the Court
eschewed express preemption analysis despite the existence of preemptive
language in the statute, and proceeded directly to a conflict preemption
analysis.473 Second, in contrast to Geier, the Court in Buckman found it
necessary to discuss the presumption against preemption, even though it
eventually concluded that the presumption was inapplicable.474
G. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
The last of the post-Cipollone preemption cases was Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, decided by the Court in December, 2002.4"' In Sprietsma,
Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that the Federal
Boat Safety Act of 1971 ("FBSA") 476 did not preempt a common-law
design defect action.477 The decision in Sprietsma resolved a long-standing
split of authority on this issue.478
The FBSA declared that it was enacted "to improve boating safety by
... authorizing the establishment of national construction and performance
standards for boats and associated equipment... [and] to encourage greater
... uniformity of boating laws and regulations as among the several States
and the Federal Government. 4 79 To further these objectives, the FBSA
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to establish "minimum safety
471 Id. at 355.
472 Id.
113 Kirk, supra note 13, at 687.474 Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 435, at 35.
471 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
476 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2003).
411 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69.
478 Cf Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (holding that
FBSA implicitly preempted design defect claims); Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp.,
49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that FBSA expressly preempted design
defect claims), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 866; Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d
541 (Mich. 1997) (finding that FBSA expressly preempted design defect claims),
with Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994)
(ruling that FBSA did not preempt common-law claims), cert. denied sub nom.
Vivian Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. Moore, 513 U.S. 1057 (1994).
79 Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-75, § 2, 85 Stat. 213-14 §
(1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.)
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standards for recreational vessels and associated equipment.""48 The
Secretary delegated this power to the United States Coast Guard.48" ' Before
promulgating boat safety regulations under the FBSA, the Coast Guard was
required to "consult with a . . . National Boating Safety Advisory
Council." '482 The Coast Guard was also authorized to "issue exemptions
from its regulation if it determine[d] that boating safety '[would] not be
adversely affected. ' ' 483 Immediately after the FBSA's enactment, the
Secretary exempted all existing state laws from preemption under the Act
with the intent of keeping these laws in force until new federal regulations
could be promulgated.4" After the Secretary issued federal regulations,
however, this wholesale exemption was modified to permit only "state laws
that regulated matters not covered by federal regulations '485 to remain in
force.486
FBSA contained a preemption provision that provided that "a State or
political subdivision... may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a
law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment
performance or other safety standard . . . that [wa]s not identical to a
regulation" promulgated under the federal act. 487 At the same time,
however, another provision of the FBSA contained a saving provision
which declared that "[c]ompliance with this chapter or standards, regula-
tions, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from
liability at common law or under State law. 488
In 1988, the Coast Guard requested that the Advisory Council appoint
a subcommittee to study the feasibility of placing shrouds or guards around
propellers to reduce the number of injuries caused by boat propellers
striking persons in the water. 48 9 After studying this issue for eighteen
months, the subcommittee concluded that the Coast Guard should not
require propeller guards, finding that they would be expensive to install,
that they would adversely affect the performance of recreational boats, and
that they would increase blunt trauma injuries when victims were struck by
480 46 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(1) (2003).
411 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 57 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(n)(1) (2002)).
482 Id. at 58 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 13,110 (2000)).
43 Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 4305).
484 Id. at 59.
481 Id. at 60.
486 Id. at 59--60.
41'46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2003).
488 Id. § 4311 (g).
489 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 60-61.
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propeller guards.49 Both the Advisory Council and the Coast Guard
accepted the subcommittee's findings.49'
Justice Stevens identified three issues raised by the Sprietsma case: (1)
Did the FBSA expressly preempt common-law tort claims? (2) Did the
Coast Gilard's decision not to require manufacturers to equip boat motors
with propeller guards preempt common-law claims? (3) Did the FBSA
create a uniform regulatory scheme that impliedly preempted any form of
state regulation?492
Observing that the FBSA's express preemption provision "appli[ed] to
'a [state or local] law or regulation,' ,493 Justice Stevens concluded that this
term referred only to positive enactments and not to common-law tort
doctrines.494 Justice Stevens maintained, "the article 'a' before 'law or
regulation,'" suggested that Congress was concerned with discrete
directives, such as those associated with statutes or administrative
regulations, and not the more generalized provisions of common-law tort
doctrines. 495 Additionally, the words "'law' and 'regulation' were used
together... [i]f 'law' were read.., to include common law, it might also
be interpreted to include regulations," thereby making the statutory
reference to "regulation" redundant.496 Therefore, a narrower reading of
"law" to include only statutes and similar legislative enactments would be
more consistent with the internal structure of the preemption provision.4 97
Justice Stevens argued that the saving clause also supported a narrow
reading of "law and regulation" because it assumed that there must be a
significant number of common-law actions to save; this would not be the
case if all of them were preempted.49" Additionally, according to Justice
Stevens, the saving clause broadly covered "liability at common law,
'' 499
while the preemption provision was more specific and detailed." Finally,
Justice Stevens pointed out that it made sense for Congress to distinguish
between administrative regulations, legislative regulations and common-
490 Id. at 61.
491 Id.
492 Id. at 55-56. The Court's later discussion of this issue treated it as an
example of field preemption. Id. at 68.






499 46 U.S.C. § 431 1(g) (2003).
"0 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63.
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law tort actions because the latter performed an important compensatory
and remedial function distinct from the purely regulatory function of
positive enactments.5"' Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that the FBSA
did not expressly preempt the plaintiffs design defect claims.0 2
Next, Justice Stevens rejected the defendant's argument that the Coast
Guard's failure to adopt a regulation requiring propeller guards impliedly
preempted the states from regulating in the areas of propeller safety.50 3
Justice Stevens reasoned that Coast Guard's acceptance of the subcommit-
tee's recommendation to take no action left the law applicable to propeller
guards unchanged.50 4 The Secretary's 1971 decision to preserve state
regulations until federal regulations were adopted indicated that the DOT
believed the FBSA left room for the states to regulate boating safety.
50 5
Moreover, the Coast Guard never claimed that common-law tort actions
would conflict with its regulatory objectives.50 6 The Coast Guard also made
it clear that its decision not to regulate in 1990 did not reflect a policy
determination that propeller guards were inappropriate or that propeller
guards could not be regulated by the states.50 7
Finally, Justice Stevens considered whether the FBSA occupied the
field, and whether allowing common-law actions would conflict with a
federal policy of promoting uniform manufacturing standards for recre-
ational boats. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the FBSA might have
amounted to an occupation of the field as far as "positive laws and
regulations but its structure and framework d[id] not convey a 'clear and
manifest intent' to... pre-empt... common law relating to boat manufac-
ture."5 8 Regarding conflict preemption, Justice Stevens conceded that
uniformity was an important statutory objective but, based on the Coast
Guard's willingness to tolerate common-law claims, this objective was not
paramount.0 9 He accordingly declared that the FBSA did not impliedly
preempt the plaintiff s common-law claims.510
50' Id. at 64.
502 id.
53 Id. at 65 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 539 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)
to support the proposition that the existence of an express preemption provision did
not foreclose the application of conflict preemption principles).
504 Id.
505 id.
506 Id. at 65-66.
507Id. at 66-68.
508 Id. at 69 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)).




The Sprietsma decision is remarkable because every member of the
Courtjoined in Justice Stevens's opinion. The Court adhered to its holdings
in Myrick 511 and Geier 512 that implied preemption could be found even
though the statute in question contained an express preemption provision. 5"3
While the court did not refer to the presumption against preemption," 4 it
did require some clear indication of preemptive intent to find the existence
of field or conflict preemption. 515 The FBSA's saving clause did not play
a major role in Sprietsma, but the Court relied on it to support the narrower
of two possible interpretations of the Act's preemption clause. 516 Finally,
the Court gave considerable weight to the fact that the Coast Guard had
never taken the position that its decision not to require propeller guards
preempted state common-law claims. 17
H. An Assessment of the Supreme Court's Post-Cipollone Preemption
Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court has decided seven cases involving
the preemption of state tort law since the Cipollone decision. This Article
has examined these cases and considered four issues: (1) the rule that the
Court should rely on express preemption analysis to determine the scope
of a federal statute's preemptive effect when the statute contains preemp-
tive language; (2) the effect of the presumption against preemption on the
Court's interpretation of preemptive statutory language; (3) the effect of a
saving clause when a statute contains preemptive language; and (4) the
deference that the Court gives to an agency interpretation of preemptive
language in statutes and regulations. Although "the Supreme Court's
numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisdictional or
analytical pattern," 518 1 will try to summarize the current state of the law
with respect to each of these issues.
The Cipollone Court first declared that it would not engage in implied
preemption analysis when the statute in question contained an express
preemption provision, at least when the statute's preemptive language
"provide[d] a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
5" Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
512 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
513 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64-65.
514 Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 435, at 39.
515 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69-70.
51 6 Id. at 63.
511 Id. at 65-66.
518 Dinh, supra note 35, at 2085.
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authority. ' ' ' 51' The Court departed from this rule in Myrick,5 20 but
seemingly returned to it in Medtronic52 ' and Shanklin.522 Since then,
however, the Court has engaged in implied preemption analysis in every
case surveyed, and it appears that this aspect of Cipollone has been
abandoned for good.
During the past decade, the Court has referred to the presumption
against preemption in some cases and ignored it completely in others. The
Court purported to apply the presumption in Easterwood5 23 and
Medtronic, 524 but failed to even mention it in Shanklin 525 or Geier.5 26 The
Buckman Court acknowledged the presumption's existence, but concluded
that it did not apply.527 The Sprietsma Court largely ignored the presump-
tion, though it did seem to employ a weak clear statement rule in connec-
tion with its implied preemption analysis. 8
Although the statutes involved in Easterwood, Myrick and Shanklin had
saving clauses, they did not figure prominently in the Court's preemption
analysis in those cases.129 The Court did address the saving clause issue in
Geier and Sprietsma, but failed to adopt any clear-cut rule. 3 ° In Geier,
however, the Court suggested that a saving clause's existence might cause
it to interpret the language of the preemption clause more narrowly than it
otherwise would and the Court in Sprietsma seems to have followed this
approach as well.53 '
The Court has, for the most part, paid close attention to an agency's
views on the preemptive scope of a statute or regulations. In Medtronic, for
example, Justice Stevens stated that his interpretation of § 360k(a) of the
MDA was "substantially informed" by the FDA regulations. 32 The Geier
Court also gave considerable deference to the DOT's interpretation of
FMVSS 208, as well as the position the agency took in its amicus curiae
"' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (quoting Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
520 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
521 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
522 Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
523 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 668 (1993).
524 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
525 Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 344.
526 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
527 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001).
528 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002).
529 See supra notes 242-304, 367-95 and accompanying text.
530 See supra notes 396-449, 475-517 and accompanying text.
531 See supra notes 396-449, 475-517 and accompanying text.
532 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,495 (1996).
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brief. 33 Additionally, the majority of the Justices in Geier rejected the
suggestion that federal agencies must be required to initiate formal
rulemaking proceedings when they wish to preempt state law by adminis-
trative regulation.134 The Sprietsma Court also deferred to the Coast
Guard's position regarding state regulation of propeller guards.5 35 The
Court's Shanklin holding seems to be the only departure from its policy of
agency deference. The Shanklin Court chided the agency for changing its
position and declared that the agency's interpretation was not entitled to
substantial deference when it not only contradicted the regulation's plain
text, but also the Court's prior interpretation. 36
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE IN THE FUTURE
Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence is in a terrible state.537 Lower
courts are both confused and frustrated because the Court's recent
preemption decisions have been neither clear nor consistent. 38 Addition-
ally, many of these decisions have encroached upon the historic police
powers of the states539 and swept away remedies which were traditionally
available to accident victims under settled principles of state tort law.
There is probably no set of bright line rules that will completely
prevent confusion, inconsistency, or encroachment upon states' rights in the
future. I believe, however, that the following suggestions would help. First,
the Court should limit itself to an express preemption analysis when a
statute contains an express preemption clause. Second, the Court should
refuse to expressly preempt state tort law when the statutory language is
ambiguous. Third, the Court should read saving clauses in pari materia
... Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
534 Id. at 885.
... Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 66-68 (2002).
536 Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000).
... Nelson, supra note 36, at 232 ("Most commentators who write about
preemption agree on one thing: Modem preemption jurisprudence is a muddle.").
538 Grey, supra note 4, at 588 ("The changing climate within the Supreme Court
as to federal preemption of state tort claims has left lower court decisions in
disarray."); Carroll, supra note 155, at 798-99 ("Some of these lower courts have
expressly noted their difficulty and confusion in applying the somewhat inconsis-
tent and abstruse precedent handed down by the high Court.").
139 Carroll, supra note 155, at 819 ("The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence
• . . has demonstrated an increasing tendency to allow federal regulation to
encroach upon state sovereignty in an unpredictable and analytically inconsistent
manner.").
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with express preemption provisions. Finally, the Court should refuse to
allow administrative agencies to preempt state tort law unless they
explicitly consider the preemption issue when formulating orders and
regulations.
A. Return to Cipollone's "No Implied Preemption "Rule
The Court should refuse to preempt state tort law on implied preemp-
tion grounds once it has concluded that the statute in question has not
expressly preempted state law.54 ° The Cipollone Court declared that it
would determine the preemptive scope of a statute solely by examining its
express terms.54' In other words, if a federal statute contained an express
preemption clause, the Court would not displace state law based on field or
conflict preemption.542 The rationale for the Cipollone Court's new rule
was similar to the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 543 If
Congress expressly preempted positive state regulations but did not
expressly preempt state tort law damage claims, the Court may reasonably
conclude that Congress did not want to impliedly preempt such claims on
occupation of the field or actual conflict grounds.544
There are, to be sure, some problems with a "no implied preemption"
rule. One concern is that such a rule, particularly if coupled with a clear
statement requirement, would require Congress to set forth the exact
parameters of a statute's preemptive scope when it enacts legislation. 45 If
Congress felt, however, that it could not draft clear and detailed preemption
141provisions, it might refuse to draft any express preemption clause and
'40 Id. at 824.
141 McCauley, supra note 231, at 843.
542 See Carroll, supra note 155, at 811-12.
143 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
5" Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 906 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
... See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for
the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1, 30 (1995).
546 See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA
Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 35,
96 (1996).
It may be that when Congress passes a statute covering a relatively narrow
subject, it can decide in advance all the preemption issues that are likely to
arise and resolve them itself. But when it enacts a lengthy and complex
statute that displaces state law ... Congress simply cannot anticipate all the
preemption problems that are likely to arise.
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leave it to the Court to define a statute's preemptive scope by means of
implied preemption analysis.547 This would defeat the whole purpose of the
"no preemption analysis" rule.
One can also argue that a "no implied preemption" rule is impossible
for the Court to apply because express and implied preemption issues
cannot be so easily pigeonholed.548 Members of the Court have certainly
injected implied preemption concepts into their express preemption
analysis. In Cipollone, for example, Justice Stevens justified his conclusion
that the 1965 Act did not expressly preempt the plaintiff's claims by
declaring that "there is no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-
emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common-law damages actions." '549 He also slipped into field preemption
analysis in Sprietsma while purporting to examine the preemptive language
of the FBSA 5 These occasional lapses, however, do not mean that a "no
implied preemption" rule is unworkable. They simply indicate that the
Justices will have to be more careful when they engage in express
preemption analysis.
Some commentators believe it unwise to limit the Court's ability to use
implied preemption analysis because doing so would prevent the Court
from recognizing Congress' broader regulatory objectives, focusing
consideration on a single statute.55 Furthermore, implied preemption
analysis enables the Court to preempt state law when changing circum-
stances produce conflicts that Congress did not anticipate when it enacted
a statute.
I do not believe any of these objections are serious enough to reject a
"no implied preemption" rule. Congress is unlikely to deliberately refrain
from drafting express preemption clauses simply to avoid the effects of a
"no implied preemption" rule. Nor is Congress really unable to draft
effective express preemption clauses. Congress has shown, on the contrary,
that it can draft clear and comprehensive preemptive language when it
chooses to do so.552 While it may be impossible for the Court to segregate
its consideration of express and implied preemption issues, a "no implied
preemption" rule will hopefully encourage the Court to make a better effort
141 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 548 ("If this is to be the law, surely only the most
sporting of Congresses will dare say anything about pre-emption.").
548 See, e.g., Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at
1419.
149 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
550 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002).
"' Stabile, supra note 545, at 85-86.
552 Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at 1433.
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to observe this distinction when it decides preemption cases. The third
objection rests on the premise that the Court should apply the preemption
doctrine aggressively in order to maximize the scope of federal regulatory
power. Since I disagree with that premise, I am not concerned that a "no
implied preemption" rule might limit the Court's ability to displace state
common law when it cannot do so using express preemption analysis.
Finally, as far as unforeseen conflicts are concerned, if they are serious
enough, Congress can amend the statute in question to preempt state law.
On the other hand, there are advantages to employing a "no implied
preemption" rule. First, such a rule protects traditional state police power
interests. Implied preemption analysis, particularly obstacle preemption
analysis, is so open-ended that courts can easily find that preemption exists
in cases where Congress did not actually intend to displace state law.553 If
the Court is required to limit itself to an express preemption analysis,
however, it is less likely to encroach upon state police power interests by
displacing state law by means of field preemption or obstacle preemption
analysis."54 Additionally, by forcing the Court to focus on the statutory text
and discouraging a "freewheeling judicial inquiry" '555 into real and
imaginary conflicts and obstacles, a "no implied preemption" rule may
produce greater consistency in preemption cases.55 6
B. Enforce the Presumption Against Preemption
The Court should consistently apply the presumption against preemp-
tion and refuse to preempt common-law tort claims unless Congress's
intent to preempt such claims is truly "clear and unambiguous." '557 The
Cipollone plurality purported to follow the presumption against preemp-
tion,558 but it largely ignored the presumption against preemption dictated
by Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.559
553 Grey, supra note 4, at 623-24.
... See Hall, supra note 57, at 268-69.
"' Carroll, supra note 155, at 824 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 894 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
556 id.
557 Id. at 822.
558 Grey, supra note 4, at 611-12 ("In Cipollone, although the Court gave lip
service to the presumption against preemption, it made no search for any statement
of congressional intent to preempt, and did not even mention the clear statement
rule.").
15' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Professor Mary
Davis contends that in recent years the Supreme Court has not only abandoned the
presumption against preemption, but has quietly applied what amounts to a
presumption in favor of preemption. See Davis, supra note 4, at 10 13-14.
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The precise legal effect of the presumption against preemption is hard
to pin down. In theory, the presumption should act like an evidentiary
presumption which would compel the Court to find that state law is not
preempted unless the presumption has been rebutted by clear evidence of
Congressional intent to preempt. None of the Justices in Cipollone
employed this approach. Justice Scalia came closest when he suggested that
the "assumption [in favor of preemption] dissolves once there is conclu-
sive evidence of intent to pre-empt in the express words of the statute
itself .. ."560
The presumption is more widely viewed as an interpretive rule
directing the Court to construe ambiguous statutory language narrowly.
561
Justice Stevens advocated such an approach in Cipollone when he declared
that the "presumption [against preemption] reinforces the appropriateness
of a narrow reading of [the statute]."S62 He argued for a narrow reading of
the statutory text in several other places of the plurality opinion.563 Justice
Stevens also, however, purported to look to the "plain meaning" of the
statutory text in a manner seemingly inconsistent with the "narrow" reading
he had previously endorsed. Justice Stevens thus declared that "[w]e must
give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe that
Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning. ''""4
Justice Scalia rejected the notion that the statutory text should be narrowly
construed in express preemption cases.565 Instead, he maintained that the
Court should "interpret Congress's decrees . . . neither narrowly nor
broadly, but in accordance with their apparent meaning."5" The apparent
or ordinary meaning advocated by Justice Scalia seems remarkably similar
to the plain meaning suggested by Justice Stevens earlier in Cipollone.
One might also treat the presumption against preemption as the
reflection of a background norm in favor of federalism.5 67 Professor
560 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545 (1992) (quoting Rice,
331 U.S. at 230).
561 Madden, supra note 4, at 107-08.
562 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
563 See, e.g., id. at 523 (declaring that the Court "must fairly-but in light of the
strong presumption against pre-emption---narrowly construe the precise language
of § 5(b)"); id. at 529 (concluding that "the phrase 'based on smoking and health'
fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not to
make fraudulent statements").564 Id. at 522 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
565 Id. at 545.
566 Id. at 544.
567 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 469 (1989). A background norm is an extra-textual moral or
political norm that supports a particular interpretation when the statutory text is
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Sunstein, for example, argues for a norm favoring disadvantaged groups.168
According to Sunstein, "[i]n the face of ambiguity, courts should resolve
interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups so as to ensure that
regulatory statutes are not defeated in the implementation process.,5 69 The
presumption against preemption, when viewed in this manner, could be
used to support a finding of no preemption of common-law claims in cases
where statutory language is unclear.
Finally, the presumption could function as a "clear statement" rule. 70
Under this approach, Congress would be required to clearly express its
intent to preempt state law and any ambiguity in the text of the statute
would be construed in favor of the states.57" ' Justice Blackmun advocated
this approach at certain points in his opinion in Cipollone.572 For example,
he concluded that "neither version of the federal legislation at issue here
provides the kind of unambiguous evidence of congressional intent
necessary to displace state common-law damage claims." '573 Justice
Blackmun also declared that "[o]ur obligation to infer pre-emption only
where Congress' intent is clear and manifest mandates the conclusion that
state common-law damages actions are not pre-empted by the 1969 Act.
574
I believe that the Court should apply the presumption as a formal clear
statement rule. If the statutory language is clear, the Court would not have
to go any further. If the language is ambiguous, however, the presumption
would foreclose any express preemption of state tort law. Under this
approach, the Court would give the words in a preemption clause their
ordinary meaning. Furthermore, unless a word was used as a term of art, the
Court would look to its dictionary definition to determine its ordinary
meaning. Thus, if Congress wished to preempt common-law tort actions,
it would have to use the term "common-law tort actions," "state tort law,"
or something similar, instead of using ambiguous terms like "standards,"
"prohibitions," or "requirements." Although such a clear statement
requirement is controversial,575 and could possibly be manipulated by
unclear. Id. at 411-12.
568 Id. at 483.
5 6 9 
id.
570 See Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption, supra note 13, at 1429.
571 Stem, supra note 92, at 1004.
572 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
573 Id. at 531.
574 Id. at 542.
175 See, e.g., Main R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 23-29 (2001) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of a clear statement requirement).
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members of the Court,576 it would be the best way to protect state interests
from unwarranted or unintended encroachment.
C. Pay Attention to Saving Clauses
The Court should construe express preemption clauses and saving
clauses together. The Court considered the effect of saving clauses in Geier
v. American Honda Motor C0.5 77 Justice Breyer treated the saving clause
as an instruction from Congress to interpret the language of the express
preemption clause narrowly rather than broadly.578 The effect of this narrow
reading was to exclude common-law tort claims from preemption.579 The
Court, however, promptly undercut this approach by holding that common-
law claims could be preempted on actual conflict grounds. 580 The Court
thus restricted the scope of express preemption, while making it easier to
displace state tort law on implied preemption grounds. The Geier Court
also rejected Justice Stevens's argument that the combination of an express
preemption provision and a saving clause created a "special burden" on a
defendant claiming that state law was preempted on actual conflict
grounds.58'
I believe that an express preemption clause and a saving clause should
be read in pari materia.5 2 There is no need to interpret either provision
narrowly. The Court instead should give the statute's words their ordinary
or plain meaning.8 3 Thus, if the saving clause declares that "compliance
with a federal safety standard does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law," '584 the Court should find that the statute does not
expressly preempt any common-law claim.
576 Stem, supra note 92, at 1012 (discussing how the Cipollone Court found
ambiguous statutory language to be "clear," thereby defeating the operation of the
presumption against preemption).
57 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
5781 d. at 868.
79 Davis, supra note 4, at 1021.
580 Haas, supra note 449, at 1936.
58 Geier, 529 U.S. at 872-73. The "special burden" theory can be found in
Justice Stevens's dissent. Id. at 898-99.
52 See McCauley, supra note 231, at 846.
583 Dinh, supra note 35, at 2113 ("Both are words in the same statute and thus
each should be given full meaning under ordinary interpretive principles.").
114 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 431 1(g) (2003) (Federal Boat Safety Act's saving
clause).
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D. Impose Requirements for Administrative Preemption
Finally, the Court should not defer excessively to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes or regulations. This involves two related issues: First,
should the Court defer to agency interpretations of the statutes under which
it operates? Second, should the court defer to an agency when it interprets
its own administrative regulations?
The issue of agency interpretation of statutes came up in Medtronic.585
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, placed considerable weight on the
FDA's interpretation of § 360k(a),586 while Justice O'Connor in her
dissenting opinion firmly rejected the FDA's interpretation of that statutory
provision, declaring that "[wihere the language of the statute is clear, resort
to the agency's interpretation is improper."5"7 The leading case on this issue
is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,588
where the Supreme Court held that courts should defer to agency interpreta-
tions of law unless "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue." '589
Despite the Court's Chevron holding, commentators disagree about
whether courts should defer to interpretations of law by administrative
agencies.59 A strong argument against deferring to agency interpretations
of their statutes was made by Professor Sunstein, who declared that
"[t]hose who are limited by a legal restriction should not be permitted to
determine the nature of the limitation, or to decide its scope."'5 9' In other
words, the scope of power delegated to an agency by statute should be
determined by an independent entity, such as a court, and not by the agency
itself.592 This argument is even more compelling when an unelected agency
585 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
586 Id. at 495.
587 Id. at 512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
588 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
589 Id. at 842-43.
590 Cf Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 ("[I]n the long run Chevron will endure and be
given its full scope-not so much because it represents a rule that is easier to follow
and thus easier to predict (though that is true enough), but because it more
accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its
needs."), with Sunstein, supra note 567, at 445 ("For several reasons, however, a
general rule of judicial deference to all agency interpretations of law would be
unsound.").




is seeking to diminish the historic police powers of the states. In my view,
the Court should not give undue weight to agency interpretations of
statutory provisions in preemption cases. In such cases, agency interpreta-
tions might be useful, but should not be treated as a substitute for a clear
expression of congressional intent.
Agency regulations may also preempt state law.593 When a regulation
is ambiguous, however, should a court defer to the agency's interpretation?
The answer would seemingly be positive, but the Court has been inconsis-
tent about this issue. In Geier, Justice Breyer placed considerable weight
on the DOT's interpretation of FMVSS 208 and the agency's conclusion
in its amicus curiae brief that at common law no airbag damage claims
should-be preempted.594 In Shanklin, however, Justice O'Connor showed
no deference to FHWA's claim that its regulations did not preempt
negligence claims based on inadequate safety devices for grade crossings
that had been constructed with federal funds.595
Instead of focusing on an agency's ex post interpretations of its
regulations, I would apply the same clear statement rule to agencies that
was suggested earlier in connection with statutes.5 96 Like Congress, if an
agency intends to preempt state law, it should make its intentions clear. If
a regulation is ambiguous, the Court should assume that no preemption
was intended. If an agency believes that the Court's interpretation is
mistaken, it can amend its regulation or make its position clear in some
other fashion. Justice Stevens proposed in Geier that the agency be
disallowed from preempting state tort law by order or regulation unless it
openly addressed the matter through formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking when the rule or order was first promulgated, or later if a need
for preemption later arose.597 In his Easterbrook dissent, Justice Thomas
also suggested that federal agencies be required to clearly define the
preemptive scope of their regulations.598 Although this might be burden-
some for the agency, it would create an opportunity for state and local
officials to protect their interests.5 99 For this reason, the Court should
seriously consider such a requirement.
'9' Dinh, supra note 35, at 2113.
... Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
'9' Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000).
596 Supra notes 557-59, 570-76 and accompanying text.
191 Geier, 529 U.S. at 884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
598 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterbrook, 507 U.S. 658, 679 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
'" Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. & Carter G. Phillips, Federal Preemption: A
Comment on Regulatory Preemption After Hillsborough County, 18 URB. LAW.
589, 601-02 (1986).
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CONCLUSION
In 1992, the Supreme Court tried to clarify federal preemption law in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. but failed to follow its own guidelines in
subsequent cases. This Article has examined the Cipollone case and
attempted to trace the twisted path of the Court's post-Cipollone jurispru-
dence in some detail. In addition, I have made a number of suggestions that
would give more protection to state police power interests against
preemption in cases where statutory language is ambiguous. I believe that
the Court's preemption decisions would be more consistent, predictable,
and protective of state interests if it took these suggestions to heart.

